College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview

Conferences, Events, and Lectures

2004

Section 7: Business Law
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 7: Business Law" (2004). Supreme Court Preview. 183.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/183

Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview

BUSINESS LAW
New Case: 03-0184 Ballardv. CIR
439

Synopsis and Question Presented
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New Case: 03-1034 Kanter v. CIR
Tax Court Secrecy Under Fireat High Court Justices Must Decide Whether to
Take Up Case That Centers Around Tax CourtReporters CurrentlyKept Under
Wraps
Marcia Coyle
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Justices to Review Tax Court Secrecy; At Issue is Whether Taxpayers in Big
Disputes Are Getting FairTrials When Legal FindingsAre Kept From Them
Associated Press
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New Case: 03-0932 Dura Pharmaceuticalsv. Broudo
Synopsis and Question Presented
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Supreme Court Ruling Could Hit FraudLawsuit Claims
Adrian Michaels

460

Wall Street Holds its Breath Over Ruling: A Case Linked to an Asthma Device
Could Settle the Issue ofLoss Causation, Which Has Divided US Courts Since 1995
Jonathan Birchall
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CorporateSecurities: Causation and Analysis
John C. Coffee
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New Case: 03-0377 Koons Buick v. Nigh
Synopsis and Question Presented

467

In re: Michael B. Price; ChristineR. Price,Debtors/Appellantsv. Delaware
State Police Federal Credit Union, U.S. Trustee, 370 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2004)
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High Court to Consideron Caps on Penalties Set by Lending Act
Robert S. Greenberger

477

Seeking Truth in CarLoans
Associated Press

478

Tricks Add Plenty to Car Costs
Robert K. Heady

479
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New Case: 03-1164 Veneman v. Livestock Marketing! 03-1165 Nebraska
Cattlemen v. Livestock Marketing
Synopsis and Question Presented
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Where's the Beef? Headingfor the Supreme Court
Linda Greenhouse
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Judge Rules Against Feesfor BeefMarketing Courts: Government is Ordered
to Stop Collecting Funds From Farmersfor Research and Promotion Campaigns
Bloomberg News
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Sizzle, Steak and Lawsuits; Supreme Court to Hear CaliforniaBeefAd Case
With Wide Implications
Tom Abate
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U.S. Court Rejects Mandatory Levy on Dairy Farmers
Scott Kilman
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Looking Ahead: Prometheus Radio Projectv. Federal Communications Commission
Synopsis and Question Presented

494

Court Backs Cross-OwnershipBan
James P. Miller
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In Media Decision, the Little Guys Lost
Sallie Hoffneister

501

Powell Calls Rejection ofMedia Rules a Disappointment
Frank Ahrens

503

Rewriting the Rules; FCC Relaxes Limits on Media Ownership
Edmund Sanders and Jube Shiver Jr.
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Senate Votes to Block FCC Media Rules
Frank Ahrens
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Lookin2 Ahead: Punitive Damages; State Farm Insurance v. Campbell
Insurers Urge U.S. Supreme Court to Change Utah Ruling in Landmark
Punitive Damages Case

514

Justices Limit Punitive Damages in Victory for Tort Revision
Linda Greenhouse

515

437

High Court Orders New Look at Punitive Award; PhilipMorris HadFaced $79.5
Million Judgment
Edward Walsh
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Ballard, Claude, et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)/
Estate of Kanter, Burton, et al. v. CIR
(03-0184/03-1034)
Ruling Below:
(Ballard v. CIR, 321 F.3d 1037, 2003-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CH) P5-,246; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2700
(11th Cir. 2003))
The Tax Court's determination that the taxpayers fraudulently failed to declare and pay income tax
on approximately $3,200,000 was affirmed. The Court of Appeals, Fay, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
application of Tax Court Rule, which allowed Tax Court Judge to review findings of Special Trial
Judge without making findings of Special Trial Judge available to parties, did not violate taxpayers'
due process rights, and (2) evidence was sufficient to support Tax Court's findings.
(Kanter v. CIR, 337 F.3d 883, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 14785 ( 7 th Cir., 2003))
The Tax Court found Kanter's underpayment of taxes was due to fraud. The Appellate Court
affirmed, finding that it was not clearly erroneous for the Tax Court to find that Kanter's
underpayment of taxes involved fraud. The Appellate Court also ruled on the argument that the
Special Tax Court's ruling needed to be made public, agreeing with the Tax Court that secrecy was
permitted.
Question Presented: Whether the Due Process Clause is violated by the application of U.S. Tax Ct.
R. 183, which allows the Tax Court Judge to conduct a review of the findings of the Special Trial
Judge without having to make his determinations available to the parties or the public?

Claude M. BALLARD and Mary B. Ballard, Petitioners-Appellants,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Decided Feb. 13, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
FAY, Circuit Judge:
determined that Ballard earned the
unreported income through a scheme with
Burton W. Kanter ("Kanter") and Robert
W. Lisle ("Lisle") to sell influence with
Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America
("Prudential") whereby suitors of Prudential

Petitioners-Appellants Claude M. Ballard
("Ballard") and Mary B. Ballard appeal the
judgment of the United States Tax Court in
which it found that Ballard fraudulently
failed to declare and pay income tax on
approximately $3,200,000. The Tax Court
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would pay Kanter kickbacks in exchange
for the influence of Ballard and Lisle,
senior Prudential employees. After receipt
of the kickback proceeds, Kanter would
funnel the proceeds of the scheme to
Ballard and Lisle through a complex web of
corporations, partnerships
and trusts
designed to shelter the money from the
reporting requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code. As a result of the Tax
Court's findings, Petitioners-Appellants
have been assessed tax deficiencies
(including penalties
against Ballard)
totaling $1,318,648.

[Ballard and Lisle worked in Prudential
Real Estate Department until 1981 and
1982, respectively, under Donald Knab
("Knab"), who was in charge of all real
estate operations and who, because of his
regard for Ballard and Lisle, was easily
influenced by their recommendations.
During their employments, Ballard reached
the position of senior vice-president for
equity operations and Lisle reached the
position of vice-president of mortgage
operations. Both had significant oversight
responsibilities. Ballard's position gave him
influence over the choice of builders and
contractors, and Lisle's had the authority to
award contracts and commit loans up to
$20,000,000.

On appeal, Petitioners-Appellants assert (1)
that application of Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure Rule ("Rule") 183,
which allowed the Tax Court Judge to
review the findings of the Special Trial
Judge without making the findings of the
Special Trial Judge available to the parties,
violated their due process rights, and (2)
that the evidence adduced at trial is
insufficient to support the Tax Court's
findings. After extensive review of the
record and consideration of oral argument,
we find that the application of Rule 183 did
not violate Petitioners-Appellants' due
process rights and that the evidence is
sufficient to support the Tax Court's finding
that Ballard received and fraudulently failed
to report income.

Ballard and Lisle met and befriended
Kanter in the 1970s. The IRS asserts that
they began a scheme whereby Prudential
suitors would pay kickbacks to Kanter for
securing Prudential business. For their
assistance in securing the Prudential
contracts, Kanter would funnel money to
Ballard and Lisle through a complex web of
Kanter- and Ballard-controlled entities
(revolving around Investment Research
Associates (IRA), a corporation formed by
Kanter with no employees beyond
bookkeepers, and no business activities) in
order to disguise the origin and lower the
tax assessed on the income. By 1983 the
IRS asserts that IRA had accrued over
$4,000,000 through the kickback scheme.
This money was divided among a series of
other corporate and stock holdings, all
related to various parties involved in
previous kickback arrangements
and
funneled to Ballard and Lisle.]

I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The factual underpinning of the case
involves allegations by the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") that Ballard and
Lisle sold influence with Prudential's Real
Estate Department to would-be Prudential
suitors via Kanter, a well-known tax
attorney and University of Chicago Law
School professor.
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B. ProceduralHistory

pursuant to Rule 183(b)," or, in the
alternative, that the Tax Court either certify
the issue for interlocutory appeal pursuant
to Rule 193 or make the initial findings part
of the record for subsequent appeal to the
circuit court. On April 26, 2000, Judge
Dawson issued an order denying the
motion. In t he o rder, Ju dge D awson n oted
that "[he] gave due regard to the fact that
Special Trial Judge Couvillion evaluated

Petitioners-Appellants received Notices of
Deficiency from the IRS pertaining to years
1975 through 1982, 1984, and 1987 through
1989, alleging that they owed additional
taxes. As to each deficiency asserted by the
IRS, the Ballards filed petitions for
redetermination in the Tax Court. Pursuant
to I.R.C. § 7443A and Rules 180, 181 and
183, the Chief Judge of the Tax Court
assigned the consolidated case to Special
Trial Judge D. Irwin Couvillion for trial. At
the conclusion of the five-week trial during
the summer of 1994, Special Trial Judge
Couvillion, in accordance with Rule 183(b),
prepared and submitted a written report
containing his findings of facts and
opinions to the Chief Judge for subsequent
review by a Tax Court Judge. In accordance
with Rule 183, none of the litigants
received a copy of Special Trial Judge
Couvillion's report at that time. Thereafter,
pursuant to Rule 183(b), the Chief Judge
assigned the case to Tax Court Judge H.A.
Dawson, Jr. for his review and final
disposition. On December 15, 1999, Judge
Dawson issued the opinion of the Tax Court
in which the Tax Court both approved of
and
adopted
Special
Trial
Judge
Couvillion's report (T.C. Memo 1999-407;
see Investment Research Assoc., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951
(1999)), a copy of which was provided to
the parties. On July 24, 2001, Judge
Dawson entered t he final order o ft he T ax
Petitioners-Appellants,
against
Court
assessing tax deficiencies of $1,318,648.

the credibility of witnesses ... and treated

the findings of fact recommended by the
Special Trial Judge as being presumptively
correct[,]" [per Rule 183(c).] On May 26,
2000, the Ballards, along with the other
petitioners, filed a s econd m otion w ith t he
Tax Court. The second motion requested
that Special Trial Judge Couvillion's
original report or other documentation be
placed under seal and made part of the
record for subsequent appellate review.
That motion was denied on May 30, 2000.
On August 22, 2000, the Ballards, once
again joined by the other petitioners, filed a
motion requesting that the Tax Court
reconsider its denial of access to Special
Trial Judge Couvillion's original report or,
alternatively, that the Tax Court grant the
petitioners a new trial. [To support this
motion, Petitioners submitted an affidavit
from Randall G. Dick, attorney for IRA and
Kanter, alleging that Special Trial Judge
Couvillion's initial report h ad b een altered
by
Judge
Dawson
and
claiming
corroboration from three unidentified tax
court judges. The tax court issued an order
denying this new motion and confirming
that Judge Couvillion's report was indeed
the report adopted by the Tax Court,
without alteration.]

[... I

On April 20, 2000, prior to the Tax Court's
final order of assessment, the Ballards,
joined by the other petitioners, filed a
motion requesting access to "all reports,
draft opinions or similar documents,
prepared and delivered to the [Tax] Court

Subsequently, the Ballards petitioned this
court for a writ of mandamus seeking an
order directing the Tax Court to provide the
Ballards with a copy of the original Special
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In short, Petitioners-Appellants' arguments
are premised upon the assertion that the
underlying report adopted by the Tax Court
is not, in fact, Special Trial Judge
Couvillion's report. Were that to be the
case, we, too, would have significant
concerns over the propriety of the process
employed in this case. However, contrary to
the
assertions,
Petitioners-Appellants'
that
reveals
clearly
to
us
record as presented
the report adopted by the Tax Court is
Special Trial Judge Couvillion's report.
This critical fact is exhibited in the August
30, 2000 Order signed by Special Trial
Judge Couvillion, Judge Dawson and the
Court.
Tax
of the
Chief Judge
Petitioners-Appellants'
Consequently,
arguments are simply without merit.

Trial
Judge
Couvillion
report
or,
alternatively, seeking an order requiring
that the Tax Court provide any changes
made by Judge Dawson to the original
Special Trial Judge Couvillion report. The
petition was denied on October 23, 2000.
II. DISCUSSION
This court reviews decisions of the Tax
Court "in the same manner and to the same
extent as decisions of the district courts in
civil actions tried without a jury." Pugh v.
Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th
Cir. 2000) (quoting I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1)).
Additionally, we review Tax Court
conclusions of law de novo and findings of
fact for clear error. Davis v. Commissioner,
210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000).

Even assuming Dick's affidavit to be true
and affording Petitioners-Appellants all
reasonable inferences, the process utilized
in this case does not give rise to due process
concern. While the procedures used in the
Tax Court may be unique to that court,
there is nothing unusual about judges
conferring with one another about cases
assigned to them. These conferences are an
essential part of the judicial process when,
by statute, more than one judge is charged
with the responsibility of deciding the case.
And, as a result of such conferences, judges
sometimes change their original position or
thoughts. Whether Special Trial Judge
Couvillion prepared drafts of his report or
subsequently changed his opinion entirely is
without import insofar as our analysis of the
alleged due process violation pertaining to
the application of Rule 183 is concerned.
Despite the invitation, this court will simply
not
interfere with
another
court's
deliberative process.

A. Due Process
Petitioners-Appellants
advance
three
grounds upon which the application of Rule
183 in this case v iolated their due process
rights.
Although articulated separately, at the basic
arguments
level, Petitioners-Appellants'
make two points: (1) since the Special Trial
Judge is the only official of the Tax Court
to hear the presentation of evidence, the
Tax Court should not be permitted to reach
a conclusion contrary to the Special Trial
Judge without re-hearing the evidence
and/or an providing the parties an
opportunity to be heard; and (2) because the
Special Trial Judge's report is not included
as part of the record, there can be no
meaningful review of the Tax Court's
Because
183(c).
per Rule
actions
Petitioners-Appellants' arguments rely upon
the same faulty premise, this court will
address them jointly.

The record reveals, and we accept as true,
that the underlying report adopted by the
Tax Court is Special Trial Judge
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Couvillion's. Petitioners-Appellants have
not demonstrated that the Order of August
30, 2000 is inaccurate or suspect in any
manner. Therefore, we conclude that the
application of Rule 183 in this case did not
violate Petitioners-Appellants' due process
rights. Accordingly, we deny the request for
relief and save for another day the more
troubling question of what would have
occurred had Special Trial Judge Couvillion
not indicated that the report adopted by the
Tax Court accurately reflected his findings
and opinion.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[The Court discusses the sufficiency of the
evidence sustaining the fraud determination
against Ballard, ultimately holding that the
tax court's determination was not "clearly
erroneous" and not in need of being
overturned.]
III. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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Burton W. KANTER, deceased, et al., Petitioners-Appellants,
V.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (CIR), Respondent-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Decided July 24, 2003.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
PER CURIAM.
below." IRA, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) at 963. Of
the forty-one issues decided by the Tax
Court, six were appealed to this court:

The Estate of Burton Kanter and Naomi
Kanter appeal a decision of the Tax Court.
This consolidated appeal deals with six out
of forty-one separate issues decided by the
Tax Court with respect to alleged
deficiencies of the late Burton W. Kanter,
his wife, Naomi Kanter, and related entities,
as well as two additional post-trial issues.
We affirm in part and reverse in part [..]

This consolidated appeal involves Kanter's
petitions for review of deficiencies assessed
during the years from 1978 to 1986, which
is itself only a portion of the original
consolidated case tried by the Tax Court in
1994[...]

1. Fraud: The Tax Court determined that
Kanter (and two colleagues) helped
individuals obtain business opportunities in
exchange for payments that later were
fraudulently diverted through a series of
Kanter-controlled entities in order to
disguise the payments' origins and lower
the tax assessed on the income (by dividing
it up and assigning parts of it to various
entities claiming losses). Kanter concedes
that there was an underpayment of taxes but
disputes that the Commissioner was able to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the underpayment was due to fraud. [...]

The trial was conducted by Special Trial
Judge Couvillion, to whom the Tax Court
had assigned the case under 26 U.S.C. §
7443A(b)(4). See also Tax Court Rule 180.
[FN3] Under the Tax Court's rules, the
Special Trial Judge (STJ) then submitted a
report containing findings of fact and
opinion to the Tax Court's Chief Judge,
who then assigned the case to Tax Court
Judge Dawson. See Tax Court Rule 183(b).
Judge Dawson subsequently issued his
opinion, which stated that the Tax Court
"agrees with and adopts the opinion of the
Special Trial Judge, which is set forth

The remaining two issues in this appeal
concern events after the conclusion of the
Tax Court's trial. Beginning in April 2000,
Kanter sought repeatedly to have the
original report filed by the STJ placed in the
record, or in the alternative made available
for this Court's review in camera. Kanter
alleged that informal conversations with
two Tax Court judges had revealed that the
issued opinion had undergone significant
alterations from the original report filed by
STJ Couvillion. The Tax Court denied all of
Kanter's motions. Kanter appeals the Tax
Court's refusal to produce the STJ's
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original report. The final issue concerns
Kanter's wife's (Naomi's) efforts to seek
innocent-spouse relief from the deficiencies
levied against her husband's estate. [...]The
United States Courts of Appeals have
exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of
the United States Tax Court. 26 U.S.C. §
7482(a)(1); Seggerman Farms, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 308 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir.2002).

judge's credibility findings without the
district judge hearing or seeing the
witnesses would raise "serious questions").
Kanter argues that in addition, our review
of the
Tax
Court's
decision
is
unconstitutionally impaired by the omission
of the STJ's report from the record.
Kanter's challenge of the Tax Court's
refusal to include the "original" STJ report
presents questions of law that we review de
novo. Pittman v. Comm'r, 100 F.3d 1308,
1312 (7th Cir.1996).

I. The STJ's Report
Kanter's first argument is that the STJ's
original report must be made a part of the
record on appeal so that this court can
determine whether the appropriate degree of
deference had been paid to it by the Tax
Court judge, whose opinion is before us.
Kanter claims that informal conversations
between his attorney and other Tax Court
judges revealed that the STJ who presided
over the trial of this case submitted a report
that
found
Kanter
credible
and
recommended rejection of much of the
Commissioner's
assessed
deficiencies,
specifically the fraud deficiency. Kanter
argues that the STJ's report cannot be
rejected by the Tax Court unless clearly
erroneous, and that, without the STJ's
report in the record, there is no way for this
court to determine if proper deference was
accorded it. Moreover, this secret and
unaccountable process of review allegedly
violates Kanter's due process rights. Kanter,
relying on a Supreme Court case examining
the relationship between U.S. district court
judges and magistrate judges, argues that
this quasi-collaborative process affords a
Tax Court the opportunity to reverse an
STJ's credibility findings without first
hearing or seeing the witnesses itself-thus
offending due process. See United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 n. 7, 100 S.Ct.
2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (observing in
dicta that in the criminal context a district
court judge's reversal of a magistrate

Of course, Kanter's
arguments are
immaterial if the Tax Court's final opinion
is the STJ's report. See Ballard, 321 F.3d at
1042-43. The Tax Court's final opinion
clearly states that it "agrees with and adopts
the opinion of the Special Trial Judge."
IRA, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) at 963. The Chief
Judge of the Tax Court, Judge Dawson, and
Special Trial Judge Couvillion himself all
signed that final opinion, and we take their
statement at face value. Therefore,
notwithstanding
Kanter's
attorney's
declaration, we accept as true the Tax
Court's statement that the underlying report
adopted by the Tax Court was in fact
Special Trial Judge Couvillion's. See
Ballard, 321 F.3d at 1042-43. This renders
moot all of Kanter's arguments.
But even if, as the dissent suggests, the
phrase "agrees with and adopts" masks
what is in fact a quasi-collaborative judicial
deliberation in which an STJ's initial
findings are malleable, neither the Tax
Court's own rules of procedure, the Federal
Rules of Appellate
Procedure, nor
Congress' scheme for appeals from Tax
Court decisions
would require the
Commissioner to include the STJ's
preliminary report as part of the appellate
record. Furthermore, this purportedly quasicollaborative process would not offend our
notions of fundamental fairness, nor would
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allows the Tax Court to overcome the
presumption of correctness it prescribes
should it find that the evidence suggests
incorrect.
were
findings
those
does not
report
the
Consequently, secreting
offend any rule-mandated check on the Tax
Court's power to decide cases assigned to

due process require the inclusion of the
report in the appellate record to preserve the
fairness of our review.
First, it is clear that the Tax Court's own
rules do not require the report to be
disclosed to the parties or made part of the
appellate record. To the contrary, its rules
specifically preclude the report's disclosure.
That the Tax Court has the power to
prescribe its own rules of procedure is
undisputed. See 26 U.S.C. § 7453; Having
exercised that rulemaking authority, the Tax
Court no longer requires an STJ's report to
be made available to the parties and, by
extension, no longer allows those parties to
file objections to it. Compare Tax Court
Rule 182(b), (c), 60 T.C. 1149, (1973)
(providing for service of the STJ's report on
each party and allowing each party to file
objections to the report's findings), with
Tax Court Rule 183, 81 T.C. 1070, (adopted
1983) (noting that "[tlhe prior provisions
for service of the [STJ's] report on each
party and for the filing of exceptions to that
report have been deleted"). Neither do the
Tax Court procedures prescribe any
particular level of deference due the STJ's
report. Under the current rule, the Tax
Court maintains sole authority to decide
cases assigned to an STJ. Tax Court Rule
183(c) The Tax Court thus acts as the
original finder of fact. Although the Rule
requires that "due regard" be given to the
STJ's opportunity to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses and that those findings be
presumed correct, see Tax Court Rule
183(c), to impose the further requirement
that the Tax Court review an STJ's findings
for clear error, as Kanter urges, would all
but abdicate the Tax Court's original
decisionmaking authority. Instead, we
believe Rule 183's due-regard language
merely instructs the Tax Court to be
cognizant that the STJ had the opportunity
to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and

an STJ.
Second, Congress has by statute precluded
direct appellate review of STJ reports. We
lack jurisdiction to review anything but
"decisions oft he T ax C ourt." 26 U.S.C. §
7482(a)(1). We have repeatedly held that
the use of the term "decisions" in § 7482
means that the appellate courts can review
only (i) dismissals (e.g., for lack of
jurisdiction) or (ii) formal determinations of
deficiency (or lack thereof). See, e.g.,
Kreider v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 580, 584 (7th
Cir.1985). In other words, a "decision" of
the Tax Court is the final formal ruling of
the Tax Court; a preliminary "report" is not
a decision. [The distinction is emphasized
in 26 U.S.C. § 7459(a)].
Third, the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure do not require that STJ reports be
made part of the statutorily required record
on appeal of a "decision" of the Tax Court.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 14
excepts appeals of Tax Court decisions
from certain rules of appellate procedure.
Among those rules not applicable to Tax
Court review is Rule 16, which provides
that the record on review of an
administrative order shall include "any
findings or report on which [the order] is
based." FED. R. APP. P. 16(a)(2). Unlike
other administrative actions, the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure thus do not
require that Tax Court decisions be
reviewed in light of the preliminary
findings upon which the decision was
based. Instead, Rule 13 notes that Rule 10
governs the contents of a Tax Court
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appellate record, and that rule does not
require the record to include any
preliminary findings or reports. Fed. R.
App. P. 13 & 10(a).

of fundamental fairness. Varian, 396 F.2d at
755 n. 2.
Given the similarities between these two
relationships, we are led to the same
conclusion that the Ninth Circuit reached in
Varian: there is no two-tier appellate
relationship between STJs and the Tax
Court. Instead, STJ reports are treated by
the Tax Court as preliminary findings only
and, in accordance with applicable rules and
statutes, are not required to be made part of
the record on appeal.

With these considerations in mind, we find
that
the
relationship
between
the
preliminary reports of STJs and the final,
reviewable "decisions" of the Tax Court
bears
striking resemblance
to the
relationship b etween reports of "divisions"
of the Tax Court and final decisions of the
Tax Court itself. A "division" is a subset of
the Tax Court (often a single judge) that is
designated to hear a single case and is
empowered to make determinations with
respect to disputes before the Tax Court. 26
U.S.C. §§ 7444(c), 7460(a). Under § 7460,
the division's decision generally becomes
the decision of the Tax Court, but the Tax
Court retains the power to review the
division's decision and render its own.
Those preliminary recommendations of the
division which do not become part of the
final decision of the Tax Court also do not
become part of the record for any additional
future review. Id. § 7460(b) ("The report of
a division shall not be a part of the record in
any case in which the chief judge directs
that such report shall be reviewed by the
Tax Court.").

This procedure, while admittedly unusual
vis a vis typical judicial procedure, does not
offend our notions of fundamental fairness.
See Varian, 396 F.2d at 755. [... D]ue
process neither requires the Tax Court to be
constrained by a formal degree of deference
to the STJ nor requires the Tax Court to
rehear witnesses whether or not it
ultimately reverses the STJ's findings....
Moreover, we agree that the "only fully
responsive remedy" to Kanter's complaint
would prove unworkable, as it would
require
the
enormous
burden and
prohibitive cost of rehearing witnesses,
which would u ltimately prove to add little
value given the continued input that the STJ
retains under Tax Court Rule 183's
purportedly quasi-collaborative process. See
post at 883-884.

Thus, the two circuits to have interpreted §
7460 have ruled that a division's
preliminary report is not part of the
appellate record and not available for
review by a federal appeals court once the
Tax Court has undertaken an internal
review. See Estate of Varian v. Comm 'r,
396 F.2d 753, 755 n. 2 (9th Cir.1968); Heim
v. Comm 'r, 251 F.2d 44, 48 (8th Cir.1958).
The Ninth Circuit noted a congressional
intent in § 7460 to preclude a two-tier
appellate relationship between the division
and the full court and determined that such
a mandate did not offend the court's notions

In as much as the final Tax Court opinion
purports to agree with and adopt the opinion
of the STJ, we therefore believe that the
final opinion reflects the true legal opinions
and findings of the STJ. Any differing
preliminary recommendations-if they ever
existed-would no longer be constitutionally
relevant because the STJ has abandoned
them. Should he feel o therwise, we would
expect him-or the Tax Court-to say so.
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As the Eleventh Circuit recently noted,
"there is nothing unusual about judges
conferring with one another about cases
assigned to them." Ballard, 321 F.3d at
1043. If Tax Court Rule 183 in fact
provides the opportunity for STJs and Tax
Court judges to conference regarding the
STJ's preliminary findings, then we have
every reason to believe that Tax Court
judges would duly regard the input of the
STJ and that he, in turn, would participate
meaningfully in the exchange. Like the
Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits, we too are
loath to interfere with another court's
deliberative process. See id. In any event,
the issue is academic since the Tax Court's
opinion in this case purports to "agree with
and adopt" Special Trial Judge Couvillion's
opinion. We will take the Tax Court at its
word and, thus, move on to a discussion on
the merits of Kanter's appeal....
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Tax Court Secrecy Under Fire at High Court
Justices Must Decide Whether to Take Up Case That Centers Around Tax Court Reports
Currently Kept Under Wraps
NationalLaw Journal
March 15, 2004
Marcia Coyle

Openness is the rule and secrecy the
exception in federal courts today. But
secrecy is the rule in a key step in U.S. Tax
Court - and is under attack in the nation's
top court.

private

interests

at

stake,"

he

says.

The Bush administration has countered in
the Ballard case that the reports merely
recommend findings to the Tax Court judge
who is assigned to review the special trial
judge's report and to issue a decision,

Two losing parties in a major civil tax fraud
case are asking the Supreme Court, in
separate petitions, to hear their claims that
secret reports by special trial judges in the
Tax Court violate due process and the
federal laws governing it. The cases are
Estate of Burton Kanter v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, No. 03-1034; and
Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, No. 03-184.

"Under Tax Court Rule 183, as well as
under the deliberative processes of courts
generally, communications between judges
(and special trial judges) to whom a case is
assigned for disposition are not produced or
disclosed to the parties," the solicitor
general argues. The stakes in what may
seem to be an arcane dispute over a
procedural rule can be enormous - and are
in the Kanter case.

The petitions address a long-simmering
controversy in the nation's tax bar over
whether the reports, which include findings
of fact and opinion in some of the Tax
Court's most complex and serious cases,
should be public - or at least available to
federal appellate courts on review, as they
were before 1983.

FraudLiability
Burton Kanter, who died in 2001, was one
of the country's top estate tax lawyers. He
was an adjunct professor of law for nearly
15 years at the University of Chicago.
Claude Ballard was a senior vice president
of Prudential Life Insurance Co. of
America.

"It's just unimaginable that this happens in
the United States today," says Richard
Pildes of New York University School of
Law, counsel in the Kanter case.

Ballard and Kanter, along with another
Prudential vice president, Robert Lisle,
operated what the government called a
kickback scheme with people wanting to do
business with Prudential. Kanter funneled
more than $3 million of the kickbacks to
Ballard through a web of corporations,
partnerships, and trusts.

broad-ranging
has
litigation
"The
implications for the way the Tax Court and
other legislative courts or administrative
agencies go about the process of
adjudicating matters with tremendous
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reviewing judge issued a decision finding
Kanter liable for tax fraud.

After discovering the kickbacks, which had
not been reported as income, the Internal
Revenue Service issued notices of
deficiency that, with interest and penalties,
totaled more than $30 million. Officials
also alleged civil fraud.

But two Tax Court judges - one a regular
judge and the other the chief special trial
judge - subsequently informed Kanter's
trial counsel, Randall Dick of San
Francisco, that the reviewing judge had
reversed the special trial judge. The special
judge had not found Kanter liable, they
said. The record does not reflect that
reversal, says Pildes, and does not explain
"under any standard of review," the
reversal of the critical findings.

The three men sought review in the Tax
Court, where the chief judge assigned the
trial to a special trial judge.
The 19 Tax Court judges are appointed to
15-year terms. The chief judge may appoint
special trial judges, who serve at the
pleasure of the court. In several classes of
trials, generally involving small amounts of
money, the special trial judges are
authorized to issue the final decision. In
cases where the claimed deficiency exceeds
$50,000, the Internal Revenue Code
authorizes the special trial judges to
conduct proceedings, including a trial, but
not to enter the decision.

The reviewing judge's decision begins with
what Pildes calls "the standard boilerplate
statement" that he "agrees with and adopts
the opinion of the special trial judge." But
that does not mean that the judge adopted
the original Rule 183 report, only the final
views of the trial judge as they were
modified by whatever discussion the
reviewing judge and trial judge had after
the report was filed.

Under Rule 183, a special trial judge is to
submit a report, including findings of fact
and opinion, to the chief judge, who then
assigns the case to a Tax Court judge or
division. That judge can accept, reject,
modify, or recommit the report.

Open, Then Secret
Through 1983, the Tax Court required the
reports to be given to the parties, who could
file exceptions to them. The rule required
special trial judges to "file" their reports,
language that made it part of the case record
on appeal.

The rule requires that "due regard" be
given "to the circumstance that the Special
Trial Judge had the opportunity to evaluate
the credibility of witnesses, and the
findings of fact recommended by the
Special Trial Judge shall be presumed to be
correct."

But by changing "file" to "submit," the Tax
Court apparently took the reports out of the
scope of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, says tax scholar Leandra
Lederman of George Mason University
School of Law. The reports aren't disclosed
to anyone outside of the Tax Court, says
Lederman, who has written an article on the
dispute for the March 22 issue of the
publication Tax Notes.

Four years after the Kanter fraud trial
(which took five weeks and generated
5,000 pages of trial transcripts and more
than 4,600 pages of briefs), the special trial
judge submitted his report. The case was
assigned to a regular Tax Court judge.
Nearly a year-and-a-half later, the
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Lederman says the nondisclosure policy is
particularly worrisome at the court of
appeals level. Rule 183, she says, contains a
standard that reviewing Tax Court judges
must follow. They must give "due regard" to
the fact that special trial judges are able to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and
they must respect the presumption of
correctness given to the findings of fact, she
said.

of the deliberative process of the Tax
Court," he says. "In fact, a regular Tax
Court judge is the only judge that is
permitted to actually issue a public opinion."
So far, the three appellate courts to consider
the issue have agreed: the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 7th Circuit in Kanter; the
11th Circuit in Ballard; and the 5th Circuit
in Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (although the court
reversed Lisle's tax-fraud liability without
having the special trial judge's report).

If appellate courts don't have the special
trial judge's report, Lederman asks, "How
do we know that standard is being complied
with? I guess we could rely on the Tax
Court saying it is, but that's not how
appellate review works."

In the 7th Circuit, Judge Richard Cudahy
issued a strong dissent, writing, "I can think
of no single item of more significance in
evaluating aT ax C ourt's decision on fraud
than the unfiltered findings of the STJ who
stood watch over the case."

Pildes agrees, saying that, when as here "the
Tax Court's own rules require it to base its
final decision, in part, on the trial judge's
original findings and to presume those
findings correct, due process must then
require that those findings be part of the
record on review."

The judge noted that the Tax Court was
unique in the "opacity of its process" and in
having got there by abandoning "a
transparent

process

-

an

evolution

completely counter to the trend" toward
openness in other areas of the law.

The government hasn't yet replied to the
Kanter petition. In Ballard, it said there is no
due process violation in the Rule 183
practice.

The Tax Court never publicly explained why
the rule changed in 1983. Practitioners have
speculated that it was unhappy with the
controversy that erupted when a regular Tax
Court judge, perhaps for the first time,
overturned findings of fact by the special
trial judge in a high-profile case. The rule
was changed shortly after that. In 1989, the
D.C. Circuit overruled the Tax Court in that
case.

"While the procedures used in the Tax Court
may be unique to that court, there is nothing
unusual about judges conferring with one
another about cases assigned to them," the
government argues. "These conferences are
an essential part of the judicial process
when, by statute, more than one judge is
charged with the responsibility of deciding
the case. And, as a result of such
conferences, judges sometime change their
original position or thoughts."

"It doesn't seem to me there is any special
reason this report should be protected other
than the possibility of embarrassment," says
George
Mason's
Lederman.
"But
disagreements between judges are aired
publicly all of the time."

Tax litigator Allen Madison of Mountain
View, Calif's Fenwick & West, an ex-Tax
Court clerk, agrees. "These reports are part
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Pildes notes how hard it is to predict
whether the Supreme Court will take the
case but says, "I think it's hard to believe
that judges who clearly understand this
bizarre, off-the-record process of secret factfinding will find it's an acceptable way for a
judicial institution of the United States to
operate."
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Justices to Review Tax Court Secrecy; At issue is whether taxpayers in big disputes are
getting fair trials when legal findings are kept from them.
Los Angeles Times
April 27, 2004
Associated Press
secrecy violates taxpayers' 5th Amendment
right not to be "deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law."

The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
review the government's way of resolving
large tax disputes, accepting a challenge that
claims taxpayers can be hit with
multimillion-dollar
judgments
without
knowing how the decision was reached.
Justices will hear a constitutional challenge
to the little-known and technical process for
people who fight government demands for
taxes. At issue are the largest cases - those
involving more than $50,000, in which
special judges hold trials and forward
recommendations to the U.S. Tax Court for
rulings.

Solicitor Gen. Theodore Olson, the Bush
administration's top Supreme Court lawyer,
said the law does not require disclosure of
all documents from Tax Court. He said
Congress would have to order the opening
of records.
Taxpayers fighting with the Internal
Revenue Service may use traditional courts.
However, they must first pay the IRS, then
file a lawsuit to try to recover the money.

Two cases justices chose to consider stem
from accusations that Claude Ballard, a real
estate executive, and Burton Kanter, a
prominent tax attorney with ties to
Hollywood, were part of a kickback scheme.
The IRS sought $30 million in back taxes
and penalties. Kanter died in 2001.

The Supreme Court review is limited to the
type of administrative court involved when
people choose to contest IRS findings
without paying up first. Trials over large
IRS demands average at least 50 per year,
often significantly more, "through the
extraordinary, secretive process at issue
here," justices were told by attorneys for
Kanter.

Richard Pildes, a New York University law
professor representing Kanter's family, said
the court would decide whether people in
tax disputes are getting fair trials. The stakes
involve not only millions of dollars, he said,
but also ruined reputations.

Kanter was a leading estate tax lawyer who
helped Hollywood finance movies in the
1960s and '70s. He was accused of taking
money from people who wanted to do
business with Prudential Life Insurance Co.
of America and funneling about $3 million
to Ballard, a vice president dealing with real
estate.

In filings, justices were told it was difficult
to defend the two because the judges'
reports to Tax Court and other paperwork
were kept secret. Tax Court, with 19
members appointed by the president, "keeps
legally binding findings of fact completely
secret," even from the appeals court that
reviews its decision, justices were told.
The Supreme Court will decide whether the
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Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. v. Broudo, Michael, et al.
(03-0932)
Ruling Below: Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, 339 F.3d 933 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 92,474, 3
Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6976, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8748 (9th Cir. 2003)
The District Court originally held that Plaintiff could not prove a causal link between Dura
Pharmaceuticals' alleged misconduct and the drop in its stock price since Dura's February 24
announcement did not include the problems associated with the Albuterol Sprios device. The
court instead found the declining stock price resulted from a more germane cause-an expected
revenue shortfall. The Appellate Court reversed, holding evidence of the fraud allegations could
be introduced to explain the loss resulting from a falling stock price because the allegations
showed that "the misrepresentation touches upon the reasons for the investment's decline in
value." Where the District Court test required a link between the alleged fraud and the
subsequent decline in stock price, the 9th Circuit's opinion did not require such a connection.
Question Presented: Should liabilities in Securities Fraud be calculated by the traditional
measure-the price of shares just before a public disclosure of trouble-or from stock prices
during periods of market deception, when the stock price was still climbing? Do shareholders
need to show a direct link between the drop in stock price and the disclosure of the fact that
there had been misleading information or merely that the price was overstated because of the
alleged fraud?

Michael BROUDO, et al Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.

DURA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., et al Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Decided Aug. 5, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge:
Michael Broudo et al. ("Appellants") appeal
the district court's dismissal with prejudice
of the second amended complaint ("SAC")
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
("FRCP") 12(b)(6). In re Dura Pharm., Inc.
Sec.
Litig.,
No.
99CV0151-L(NLS)
(S.D.Cal. Nov. 11, 2001). Because 1) the
SAC satisfied the loss causation element of

a Section 10(b) violation of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to
the Albuterol Spiros device; and 2) the
district court abused its discretion in not
permitting Appellants to amend the SAC to
include additional allegations regarding
Dura's Ceclor CD sales, the district court's
judgment is reversed and remanded.
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Background

20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act
and Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated by the
Securities Commission, which, in due
course, were consolidated. The district court
granted Dura's motion to dismiss the
Consolidated and Amended Complaint but
dismissed it without prejudice. In doing so,
the court instructed the Appellants as
follows:

This securities fraud case is a class action
on behalf of investors who purchased Dura
Pharmaceutical securities between April 15,
1997, and February 24, 1998 ("the class
period"). This appeal is drawn specifically
to alleged misleading and untrue statements
made by Dura and its officials (collectively
"Dura") about Dura's Albuterol Spiros
delivery device for asthma medication and
Dura's Ceclor CD antibiotic. During the
class period, Dura issued several press
releases indicating satisfactory development
and testing of the Albuterol Spiros Device
and claiming rising sales of Ceclor CD,
both of which Appellants allege were
known to Dura and the individual
defendants to be untrue.

The amended complaint shall comply with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and
concisely set forth each allegedly false or
misleading statement or omission, and
follow each statement or omission with the
specific reasons why the statements were
false when made or why the Defendants had
a duty to disclose. In addition, the Plaintiffs
shall specify which Defendants made the
statements and knew the "true facts" that
should have been disclosed. In re Dura
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. Securities Litigation,
No. 99CV0151L(NLS)
2000 WL
33176043, (S.D.Cal. Jul. 11, 2000).
Appellants subsequently filed the SAC
which the district court also dismissed, this
time, however, with prejudice.

In the class period, Dura's stock reached a
high of $53 per share. On the last day of the
class period, February 24, 1998, Dura
revealed that it expected lower than-forecast
1998 revenues and 1998 earnings per share
("EPS") due to, inter alia, slower-thanexpected sales of Ceclor CD. Dura's stock
then dropped from $39 1/8 on February 24,
1998, to $20 3/4 on February 25, 1998, a
loss. Throughout the
47% one-day
remainder of 1998, Dura's business
declined. In an April 16, 1998 conference
call with stock analysts, Dura revealed that
as early as December 1997, wholesale
channels had been clogged with many
months of excess inventory and that actual
sales of several p roducts, including C eclor
CD, had in fact been declining. Later, in
November 1998, Dura also revealed that the
FDA found the Albuterol Spiros device not
approvable due to electro-mechanical
reliability
issues
and
chemistry,
manufacturing, and control concerns.

With respect to the Albuterol Spiros device,
the district court found that Appellants had
not properly pled the loss causation element
of a 10(b) violation. Specifically, the
district court focused on the last day of the
class period-February 28, 1998-and Dura's
revelation that day which led to the large
drop in stock price: The SAC does not
contain any allegations that the FDA's nonapproval [of the Albuterol Spiros device]
had any relationship to the February price
drop. Accordingly, the SAC does not
explain how the alleged misrepresentations
and omissions regarding Albuterol Spiros
"touched" upon the reasons for the decline
in Dura's stock price. Rather, the decline in
Dura's stock price was the result of an
expected revenue shortfall. Accordingly,

Appellants filed several class actions
alleging violations of sections 10(b) and
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abuse of discretion. See In re Vantive Corp.
Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1097 (9th
Cir.2002).

the SAC's allegations regarding Albuterol
Spiros are insufficient to state a claim.
In re Dura Pharm., slip op. at 15. The
district court reasoned further that because
the February 24 announcement did not
mention the Albuterol Spiros device, any
omissions or misleading statements about
this device could not be said to have caused
the decline in p rice. T herefore, the district
court ruled that the loss causation element
was not met.

In order for plaintiffs to properly allege a
claim brought under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, they must
state the following: (1) defendants made a
false statement or omission with regard to a
material fact;. (2) in connection with the
purchase or the sale of a security; (3) with
scienter [state of mind involving malice
aforethought]; (4) upon which plaintiffs
reasonably relied; and (5) that proximately
caused the alleged loss. See Binder v.
Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th
Cir. 1999).

Turning to Dura's statements regarding
Ceclor CD sales made during the class
period, the district court found that
Appellants' allegations in the SAC were not
sufficient to indicate that these statements
were false and made with knowledge of
their falsity. Id. at 20. The district court
therefore held that the allegations in the
SAC were not sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss based on the scienter
requirement for a § 10(b) violation. Id.

Loss Causation
"The causation requirement in Rule 1Ob-5
securities fraud cases includes 'both
transaction causation, that the violations in
question caused the plaintiff to engage in
the transaction, and loss causation, that the
misrepresentations or omissions caused the
harm.' " Id. at 1065 (quoting McGonigle v.
Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 820 (9th Cir.1992)).
In this circuit, loss causation is satisfied
where "the plaintiff shows that 'the
misrepresentation touches upon the reasons
for the investment's decline in value.' " Id.
at 1066 (quoting McGonigle, 968 F.2d at
821); accord Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d
1478, 1492 (9th Cir.1996); Binder, 184
F.3d at 1066 (9th Cir.1999).

The district court then dismissed the
complaint with prejudice "[b]ecause the
Plaintiffs have had an opportunity to amend
the complaint to meet the pleading
requirements under the PSLRA and Silicon
Graphics." Id. at 23. This appeal followed,
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
Discussion
A complaint's dismissal under FRCP
12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. See Howard
v. Everex Sys., 228 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th
Cir.2000). And on review, the court must
the complaint's well-pleaded
accept
allegations as true and construe them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. See In
re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d
970, 983 (9th Cir.1999). A district court's
denial of leave to amend is reviewed for

This "touches upon" language is admittedly
ambiguous. [...] Our cases have held,
however, that: "[i]n a fraud-on-the-market
case, plaintiffs establish loss causation if
they have shown that the price on the date
of purchase was inflated because of the
misrepresentation." Knapp, 90 F.3d at 1438
(emphasis added) (citing Gray v. First
Winthrop Corp., 82 F.3d 877, 886 (9th Cir.
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1996)).. .Accordingly, for a cause of action
to accrue, it is not necessary that a
disclosure and subsequent drop in the
market price of the stock have actually
occurred, because the injury occurs at [and
damages are measured from] the time of
the transaction. [This view is not held by all
circuits, in particular the 3rd and 9th circuits,
which require the complaint to demonstrate
a corrective disclosure followed by an
alleged stock price drop.]

Scienter
The pleading requirements for securities
fraud actions are articulated in the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"). First, the complaint must
"specify each statement alleged to have
been misleading, the reason or reasons why
the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief,
the complaint shall state with particularity
all facts on which that belief is formed." 15
U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1) (2000). The second
requirement of the PSLRA is that the
plaintiff plead "with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of
mind." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).

Here the district court... found "[t]he SAC
does not contain any allegations that the
FDA's non-approval [of the Albuterol
Spiros device] had any relationship to the
February price drop. Accordingly, the SAC
does not explain how the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions regarding
Albuterol Spiros 'touched' upon the reasons
for the decline in Dura's stock price." Dura
Pharm., slip op. at 15. This reasoning
presumes that the loss causation element
requires a demonstration of a corrective
disclosure followed by a stock price drop
during the class period and that those facts
must be alleged in the complaint.

[In the 9th Circuit, the complaint must
allege that the false or misleading
statements were made intentionally, with
deliberate recklessness, or, in the case of
forecasts, with actual knowledge of the
falsity or misleading nature. If pleadings do
not state with sufficient peculiarity, or do
not as a whole raise a strong inference of
knowledge or deliberate recklessness, the
complaint should be dismissed under FRCP
12(b)(6).]

As we explain, it is necessary in the
pleading to allege 1) that the stock's price at
the time of purchase was overstated and 2)
sufficient identification of the cause for this
overvaluation. Appellants have pled that the
price of the stock was overvalued in part
due to the misrepresentations by D ura and
defendants that the
the
individual
development and testing of the Albuterol
Spiros device were proceeding satisfactorily
and that FDA approval of the device was
imminent. Accordingly, the district court
erred by finding that appellants failed to
plead loss causation sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss with regard to statements
concerning the Albuterol Spiros device.

... We must decide whether the Appellants

met this scienter requirement with regard to
their allegations concerning Dura's Ceclor
CD sales.
At issue are statements made by Dura
reporting increased market share of Ceclor
CD and expressing optimism with respect
to Ceclor CD's future results. Specifically,
the SAC alleges that Dura made
misrepresentations that sales of Ceclor CD
had been positive throughout the year when
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these reports, coupled with Dura's
statements that it was pleased with sales
figures, are not specific facts that strongly
suggest actual intent by Dura to mislead
Dura's internal
fact,
investors. In
expectations could have been aggressive
and falling short of them may have been
anticipated. Further, while unusual stock or
suspicious stock sales can serve as
circumstantial inference of scienter, see In
re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 986, the
allegations of insider trading in the SAC do
not indicate that the individual defendants'
trading practices were dramatically out of
line with their prior trading activities.
stuffing"
"channel
Turning to the
allegations, as the district court explained,
channel stuffing claims may have some
probative value insofar as the channel
stuffing was done so as to artificially inflate
income, but there may also be other
legitimate reasons for attempting to achieve
sales earlier. We see no fault with the
district court's conclusion that here the
allegation of channel stuffing was
insufficient for scienter.

it issued statements indicating that Dura
was "pleased" with the sales results of
various quarters and that the company was
"happy" with the strong progress made in
selling Ceclor CD throughout the year.
(SAC 1f 56, 85, 111, 128). Appellants
allege that these statements were false or
misleading because sales of Dura's major
drug products were flat or declining,
particularly Ceclor CD, with actual sales to
consumers dropping throughout the class
period. (SAC
58(a)). Appellants further
allege that the defendants knew of these
declining sales through specialized reports
which compared actual versus planned sales
of Dura's drug products. (SAC 1 62) Thus,
the defendants were kept apprised of Dura's
drug sales and knew that such sales were
below plan and insufficient for Dura to
achieve continued growth in sales and
earnings. (SAC T 62).
To support the allegations that Dura was
aware of the falsity of the favorable
statements, Appellants further allege Dura
and the individual defendants engaged in
insider trading, raised capital through a
stock offering, and engaged in "channel
stuffing" (the premature pushing of product
into the wholesale channels to artificially
inflate sales)... [whereby] Dura's Ceclor CD
sales were artificially inflated and Dura's
insiders knew that as a result of
"borrowing" millions of dollars of sales of
Ceclor CD from future periods, Dura's sales
of Ceclor CD would fall sharply once this
practice stopped. (SAC 58(d)).

While the district court did a detailed
analysis of the Appellants' separate
arguments for scienter, its task was not
complete. This court has made clear that
allegations of scienter must be collectively
considered-...Accordingly, we must vacate
the district court's finding of no scienter.
On remand the district court should perform
the final step of considering the Appellants'
allegations collectively when conducting its
scienter analysis.

The district court discussed each of these
allegations separately and concluded that
each was insufficient to show scienter. As
explained above, the pleading requirement
for the element of scienter in a securities
fraud case is high. The existence of reports
that showed Ceclor CD sales were below
internal projection and Dura's knowledge of

Leave to Amend
Finally, Appellants assert they should have
been granted the opportunity to amend the
SAC. Leave to amend under FRCP 15 is to
be liberally applied. Where the plaintiff
offers to provide "additional evidence" that
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would add "necessary details" to an
amended complaint and such offer is made
in good faith, leave to amend should be
granted. See Eminence Capital v. Aspeon,
Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir.2003)
(holding that the district court erred in not
granting leave to amend the complaint in a
securities fraud case in order for plaintiffs
to meet the scienter requirement of the
PSLRA). Specifically, "[d]ismissal with
prejudice and without leave to amend is not
appropriate unless it is clear on de novo
review that the complaint could not be
saved by amendment." Id. at 1052.

CONCLUSION
Dura invites us to affirm the district court's
judgment based on issues not decided by
the district court. Specifically, Dura asserts
that the alleged misleading statements are
not actionable because they are protected by
the safe harbor and bespeaks caution
doctrines, that non-speaking defendants
cannot be liable under section 10(b), and
that Appellants failed to plead "all facts" to
support their "information and belief'
allegations. While Dura is correct that we
may affirm the district court's judgment on
a different ground, we need not do so.
Indeed, we usually do not. See Andersen v.
Cumming, 827 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th
Cir.1987) (stating "[o]rdinarily we will not
decide an issue that was not addressed by
the district court") (citing Greater Los
Angeles Council ofD eafness v. Zolin, 8 12
F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir.1987)). We
decline Dura's invitation for this reason.
Further, because we are granting Appellants
leave to amend the SAC, Dura's "other"
arguments may be mooted by such
amendment. Accordingly, it would be
improper for us to rule on those issues.

With respect to Ceclor CD sales, Appellants
seek to amend the SAC to include, inter
alia, statements by a confidential witness
who has direct knowledge that at least two
of the defendants discussed how they could
make stock analysts "perceive" that Dura
was doing better than it actually was and
that one of the defendant's oft-stated catch
phrase to employees who questioned his
tactics was "let 'em catch us." Such
allegations are the type that could
demonstrate a strong inference that Dura
knowingly or with deliberate recklessness
made false or misleading statements to
investors. A ccordingly, we cannot say that
the SAC could not be saved by amendment.

We hold Appellants have sufficiently pled
loss causation to survive a motion to
dismiss
with regard to
statements
concerning the Albuterol Spiros device.
Additionally, Appellants have shown that
they should have been granted leave to
amend the SAC. Therefore, the judgment of
the district court is

Because it appears that Appellants had a
reasonable chance of successfully stating a
claim if given another opportunity, the
district court abused its discretion in
denying leave to amend the SAC. [The
court did not limit amendments to the SAC
to Ceclor CD related allegations.]

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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Supreme Court Ruling Could Hit Fraud Lawsuit Claims
FinancialTimes
June 29, 2004
Adrian Michaels

The starting point for liability claims can
therefore differ greatly. The US's Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has tended to be in
favour of the more expansive view of
liability.

Class-action legal claims for billions of
dollars might have to be heavily scaled back
when the US Supreme Court rules on a case
involving the calculation of liabilities in
securities fraud. The Supreme Court
yesterday said it would look at a lower-court
ruling involving Dura Pharmaceuticals,
which is now owned by Ireland's Elan.
Class-action lawyers involved in cases such
as Enron have been closely watching the
Dura issues.

Now the Supreme Court could decide to
take a position at the other end of the
argument, limiting the potential liabilities
just to falls from the share price at the point
of public disclosure of trouble. A decision is
unlikely before next year.

Lawyers representing the Dura side have
argued the law is unclear when determining
the potential for investors seeking redress
after accounting or other wrongdoing at a
company causes shares to fall.

Class-action lawyers have filed suits
such as
targeting many defendants
investment banks that, it is alleged, arranged
finance and underwrote share and bond
issues that helped perpetrate a fraud on the
market by portraying clients' financial
positions and growth prospects in too
favourable a light.

The s tarting p oint for d etermining I oss h ad
traditionally been the price of the shares just
before a company admitted something was
wrong and made a public "corrective
disclosure", said Jeffrey Barrack of Barrack
Rodos & Bacine, the law firm leading the
class action in the WorldCom fraud case.

Citigroup in May said it would pay Dollars
2.65bn to end lawsuits over the collapse of
WorldCom, the telecoms group. The bank
denied any wrongdoing but settled to put
litigation behind it.

But wronged investors have tried to argue
that shares often fall from much higher
peaks than that just before an adverse public
announcement. The investor losses therefore
should be calculated from periods when the
market was being deceived about the true
worth of a company and the share price was
still climbing.

Some lawyers believe the Supreme Court's
deliberations could cause other banks on
Wall Street to wait and see if potential
liabilities are cut.
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Wall Street holds its breath over ruling: A case linked to an asthma device could settle the
issue of loss causation, which has divided US courts since 1995
FinancialTimes
July 12, 2004
Jonathan Birchall

There may be no obvious link between
asthma medication and the collapse of the
US internet stock bubble. But when the US
Supreme Court rules on a case involving
unhappy shareholders and an unsuccessful
asthma respirator, Wall Street will be
holding its breath. The court has decided to
hear a suit involving Dura Pharmaceuticals,
now part of Elan, the Irish drugmaker,
which hinges on a question that has
continued to vex US securities fraud classaction cases: can a direct link be made
between investors'
losses and false
statements or misleading information issued
by the company involved?

over Dollars 20 in February 1998, following
an announcement of disappointing sales
figures.
But in its ruling on the case, the San
Francisco-based Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit said shareholders could argue
that misleading statements about the
prospects for a new asthma device had
inflated Dura's share price, and caused some
of their losses even though the device was
not rejected by regulators until November
1998, 10 months later.

The issue known as loss causation has
divided the US courts since Congress
introduced the concept in a 1995 reform of
securities law.

"Loss causation does not require pleading a
stock price drop following a corrective
disclosure or otherwise," the court said. "It
merely requires pleading that the price at the
time of purchase was overstated and
sufficient identification of the cause."

"The courts have been all over the place on
this issue, and everyone is happy that the
Supreme Court is stepping in," says Tom
Dewey, of law firm Dewey, Pegno and
Kramarsky.

"The Ninth Circuit ruling gives pretty much
an open ticket as far as loss causation is
required," says Lyle Roberts, a lawyer who
has tracked the debate on his online
commentary, The 1OB-5 Daily.

According to the Securities Industry
Association, the conflict over interpretation
"affects hundreds of millions of dollars in
damage awards, settlements, attorneys' fees,
and costs imposed on the federal judicial
system".

The federal courts covered by the Ninth
Circuit hear about half the securities fraudclass actions filed in the US every year. But
a majority of appeal courts including the
influential Second Circuit that covers New
York maintains that damages can only be
claimed if a share price falls following
"corrective disclosure".

The Dura case involves a suit brought by
investors after the company's share price
dropped from highs of Dollars 53 to just
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This view was forcefully reflected last year
in a lower district court in New York by
Judge Milton Pollack, in a case involving
Merrill Lynch and arising from Wall Street's
"tainted research" scandal.

the federal securities laws into a scheme of
cost-free speculators' insurance".
"It's fair to say that they are at opposite ends
of the spectrum," says Mr Roberts,
contrasting the Dura ruling with the Pollack
approach. Mr Roberts also notes that other
New York judges have taken a less strict
view of loss causation: another, similar,
tainted research case against Lehman
Brothers has been allowed to proceed.

The case is part of a series brought against
Wall Street banks, arguing that stock market
losses were caused in part by deliberately
over- optimistic statements from analysts.
But, as in the Dura case, there was no
"corrective" information until after the price
drop had occurred: evidence of analysts'
duplicity unearthed by Eliot Spitzer, New
York attorney-general, came only after the
internet stock bubble had collapsed.

The Supreme Court isn ot expected to rule
on the Dura case until 2005; an appeal in the
Merrill Lynch case is due to begin in New
York next month, although some lawyers
believe that ruling may be put off until after
the Supreme Court acts.

The investors cited the infamous e-mails in
which Henry Blodget, Merrill's former star
analyst, derided stocks he was publicly
recommending as pieces of "crap", "junk"
and worse.

The US government, meanwhile, is backing
the call for the court to overturn the Dura
ruling. "By requiring issuers of securities to
expend time and resources litigating, and in
most cases settling, such law suits, the Ninth
Circuit decision is more likely to harm than
to aid the intended beneficiaries (of US
securities law)," the government argued.

But, according to Judge Pollack, the
plaintiffs were "seeking to lay the blame for
the enormous internet bubble solely at the
feet of a single actor", and hoped "to twist
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Corporate Securities: Causation and the Analyst
New York Law Journal
July 15, 2004

John C. Coffee Jr.
Two weeks ago, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided to reconsider loss causation,
granting certiorari in Broudo v. Dura

insufficient to demonstrate loss causation.

Pharmaceuticals,

transaction turned out to be a losing one.

Inc .... Although

Rather, the plaintiff must "show that the
misstatements were the reasons that the

Broudo

probably presents an easy case for the Court,
the context of the securities analyst involves
special and complex problems.

The Context of Analyst Reports
In the recurring scenario, plaintiff pleads
with particularity that a securities analyst
issued highly favorable, but wildly

Let's start with the basics: Every plaintiff in
a Rule 1Ob-5 action must prove both
"transaction causation" and "loss causation."
Transaction causation has much in common

optimistic,

reports

that

overstated

the

company's prospects and/or future revenues,
and further alleges a variety of undisclosed
conflicts of interest to which the analyst was
subject. Defendants will reply that these
statements and omissions, even if materially
false or incomplete, do not demonstrate loss
causation because there was an intervening
cause: the classic bursting of the stock
market bubble. To this, plaintiffs will
respond that defendants knowingly inflated
the bubble and that nothing is more
foreseeable than that an inflated bubble will
sooner or later deflate in a relatively
efficient
market.
Because
proximate
causation has classically stressed the
concept of foreseeability, plaintiffs will
assert that a reasonable person in
defendant's position would have foreseen
that an artificially inflated market would
eventually
deflate.

with the concepts of "but for" causation and
reliance, and loss causation is often (and
loosely) equated with the concept of
proximate causation. [T]he Second Circuit

recently cautioned in AUSA Life Ins. Co. v.
Ernst & Young that courts should not

"overwork the analogy between proximate
cause in common law negligence and
proximate causation in federal securities law
violations."...
Although many examples can be given in

which a materially false statement caused
the plaintiff to purchase the securities in
question but the actual loss was entirely
attributable to independent and unrelated
reasons, the recurring and more difficult
case in analyst litigation arises when the
plaintiff adequately pleads that the stock
price was inflated at the time of purchase
("purchase-time value disparity" in the new
language of the cognoscenti), but the parties
dispute whether the ultimate loss was related
to that original disparity between the stock
price and intrinsic value. Clearly, if some
independent event intervenes and causes a
sudden stock price decline, the original
"purchase-time
value
disparity"
is

Division Within the Circuit

Judge Gerald Lynch was confronted with a
... sinister fact pattern: the use of research

analyst reports to inflate the stock price in a
"pump and stock" manipulation in which the
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individual questions. In turn, this required a
finding, they argued, that the analyst's
misrepresentations had actually affected the
market price.

defendants allegedly bailed out after driving
the price up. No such conduct was alleged in
the Merrill Lynch case. Plaintiffs in
Demarco did not allege that they had read
the analyst research reports in question, but
instead relied on the "fraud on the market"
doctrine. Defendants, relying on the Merrill
Lynch decision, asserted that this doctrine
did not apply to analyst reports, but only to
misrepresentations by insiders.

Although the Second Circuit has not yet
accepted this argument, its statement in
Hevesi that this claim amounts to a
"substantial legal argument' suggests that it
is inclined to accept it. Indeed, grasping at
any straw to buttress its argument, the
Second Circuit decision cited, without
blushing, an article in the New York Law
Journal by a "prominent scholar of federal
securities law" on the Columbia Law School
faculty who once wrote: "Only in a case
where the publication of the [analyst] report
clearly moved the market in a measurable
fashion would the 'fraud on the market'
doctrine seem fairly applicable."

Judge Lynch found this argument overbroad,
at least for purposes of a motion to dismiss,
because he sensibly recognized that
information from non-insider sources could
also move the market. Still, he agreed that
"defendants may be able to rebut the fraudon-the-market presumption of plaintiffs
reliance after discovery." At least, two other
Southern District decisions preceding Judge
Lynch's decision seemed also to have taken
the same position that the fraud on the
market doctrine presumptively applies.

That commentator was intending to
distinguish two polar cases: (1) a single
analyst among a herd of twenty or more
following a particular company, whose
research reports may have been misleading,
but did not move the market, and (2) a
leading analyst whose work the entire
market followed and relied upon. Ironically,
Mr. Blodget may be the best example of the
latter case, and yet ironically the action
against him was dismissed.

Nonetheless, the Second Circuit has decided
to grant an interlocutory appeal to review
the applicability of the "fraud on the
market" doctrine to analyst reports. In
Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., the Second Circuit
found that District Judge Denise Cote in the
WorldCom litigation had for the first time
extended the "fraud-on-the-market" doctrine
to opinions expressed by a research analyst
and that this decision presented a novel and
legally significant issue. Uniquely, Judge
Cote's decision came at the class
certification stage, whereas other district
courts that had invoked the doctrine
(including judges Lynch and Rakoff) had
done so only at the motion to dismiss stage.
As a result, the defendants could raise the
context-specific argument that the action
should not be certified under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) - unless the court
first made specific findings that the common
issues of law and fact predominated over the

When the Second Circuit does eventually
reach this issue in Hevesi, it might well
consider carefully a decision last week that
has I aid o ut an i ntelligent p ath f or them to
follow. In Demarco v. Lehman Brothers,
Inc., District Judge Jed Rakoff concluded
that the "fraud-on-the-market doctrine may
in certain conditions apply to analyst
reports," but he still found plaintiffs
evidence insufficient in the case before him.
The beauty of the Rakoff approach is that it
bridges the seeming "all or nothing" gap
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between the decisions of judges Pollack and
Lynch. In contrast to Judge Pollack, Judge
Rakoff finds that "a reasonable investor is
entitled to assume that the analyst is
providing his honest opinion, rather than, as
here alleged, lying in order to manipulate the
market." In contrast to Judge Lynch's
decision in Demarco, Judge Rakoffs
approach provides defendants with an
immediate
opportunity
to
challenge
causation (prior to the summary judgment
stage) if plaintiffs assert a "fraud on the
market" theory. Under Judge Rakoff's
decision, which, like Judge Cote's decision,
dealt with class certification, the plaintiffs
must make a prima facie showing of market
impact.

between the false statements and the
economic harm suffered by plaintiffs. This,
however, is not the rule in the Ninth Circuit.
In
Broudo,
the
defendant
Dura
Pharmaceuticals allegedly issued false press
releases concerning its asthma medication
that allegedly inflated its market price. Then,
on the last day of the class period, it issued a
press release disclosing I ower than forecast
revenues and earnings, which it attributed to
poor sales of another drug. Its stock price
suffered an immediate 47 percent one-day
loss. The District Court dismissed the
complaint for failure to properly plead loss
causation, both because the press release
never discussed or corrected earlier
disclosures about the asthma medication and
because when such corrective disclosure did
later reach the market, after the class period,
the market price did not respond. Still, the
Ninth Circuit held that "it is not necessary
that a disclosure and subsequent drop in the
market price of the stock have actually
occurred, because the injury occurs at the
time of the transaction." Loss causation, it
concluded, "merely requires pleading that
the price at the time of purchase was
overstated and sufficient identification of the
cause."

Because analyst opinions are "far more

subjective and far less certain, and often
appear in tandem with conflicting opinions
from other analysts as well as new
statements from the issuer," he finds that
"no automatic impact on the price of
security can b ep resumed a nd instead must
be proven and measured before the
statement can be said to have 'defrauded the
market' in any material way."' Thus, he
holds that "the
'fraud-on-the-market'
doctrine applies in a case premised on a
securities analyst's false and fraudulent
opinions or recommendations only where
the plaintiff can make a prima facie showing
that the analyst's statements materially
impacted the market price in a reasonably
quantifiable respect." The practical result
will be a somewhat one-sided hearing,
because the defendants cannot offer contrary
evidence to rebutt plaintiffs' experts or to
challenge the merits of the underlying
claims.

Predictably, this approach will not survive
the Supreme Court. But, even if the Court
requires the plaintiff to plead that the decline
in stock price was caused by public
disclosures of the "truth," should merely
pleading such a relationship be sufficient?
Or should some similar prima facie showing
also be required? The context of analyst
litigation is different than that of Broudo or
issuer statements generally, because there is
seldom any corrective disclosure by the
analyst. Rather, the inflated price may erode
slowly as other analysts release different
opinions or the issuer releases new

Should this same approach also be applied
to the related issue of loss causation? In
most circuits, including the Second Circuit,
the plaintiff must show a causal link
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information.
Here, an important difference surfaces
between transaction causation and loss
causation. Transaction causation is a
relevant question at the class certification
stage.... Loss causation is almost always a
common issue that will not interfere with
class certification. Hence, loss causation
probably can only be challenged today on
the factual level at summary judgment.
Nonetheless,
expert
testimony seems
possible as to whether a gradual stock price
decline was a slow and foreseeable erosion
of the original price inflation caused by the
analyst's misleading report or is explained
by new and unrelated news reaching the
market. D efendants, h owever, w ill bear the
burden of proof at this stage.
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Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, Bradley
(03-0377)
Ruling Below: (Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 319 F.3d 119; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
1845; 50 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1346 (4th Cir. 2003))
The district court held that a credit transaction had been consummated even though the dealer
did not countersign the TILA (Truth in Lending Act) documents, and therefore liability attached
when the consumer committed himself to the purchase of credit. This was affirmed by the
appellate court, a majority of which then held that the consumer was entitled to twice the entire
finance charge in damages for breach of the TILA, under the 1995 version of 15 U.S.C.
§ I640(a)(2)(A).
Question Presented: Whether $1,000 statutory limit originally adopted as a cap on Truth In
Lending Act (TILA) recoveries under 15 U.S.C. §1640(a)(2)(A)(i) was rendered inapplicable
by the 1995 amendments to the TILA, thereby enabling parties to recover more than $1000?

Bradley NIGH, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.

KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INCORPORATED, et al., Defendant-Appellants,
Bradley Nigh, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.

Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Incorporated, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Decided Feb. 4, 2003

[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge.
Bradley Nigh sued Koons Buick Pontiac
GMC, Inc. (Koons Buick) for claims under
the Truth In Lending Act (TILA), the
Federal Odometer Act (FOA), and the
Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA),
along with numerous claims sounding in
contract, fraud, and conversion, all in
connection with his purchase from Koons
Buick of a used 1997 Chevrolet Blazer.
Koons Buick filed a counterclaim for

breach of contract and fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentation. At summary
judgment, the district court granted
judgment on several claims and all the
counterclaims. Some of Nigh's TILA, FOA,
and VCPA claims survived for a jury trial
and resulted in a verdict finding Koons
Buick liable for $24,192.80 under TILA,
and for $4,000.00 under the VCPA. Koons
Buick appeals from the jury's verdict, as
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assignment of the payments owed under
RISC I and the transaction would close.
Koons Buick, however, was unable to find a
willing lender. Consequently, it restructured
the deal to require an additional $2,000
down payment. The dealership represented
this change to Nigh as a "better deal" at a
lower rate, necessitating a new RISC (RISC
II). Nigh returned to the dealership on
February 25 based on this representation,
but told Koons Buick he did not have an
additional $2,000. He asked to return the
new truck, retrieve his trade-in vehicle, and
walk away from the deal. Koons Buick,
however, told him he could not withdraw
because it had sold his trade-in. Nigh,
unaware of this statement's falsity, and at a
loss, signed RISC II and a $2,000
Promissory N ote toc over t he a dded d own
payment.

well as from several of the court's orders.
Nigh, in a cross-appeal, also challenges
several of the court's orders. Finding no
error in the verdict or the court's rulings, we
affirm the judgment below.
I.
This case arose from Koons Buick's sale of
a truck to Bradley Nigh. The sale was not a
simple cash-for-product exchange, but
involved a somewhat tortured effort by
Koons Buick to provide Nigh consumer
financing. Nigh first went to K oons B uick
on February 4, 2000. While there, he
decided to trade in his prior vehicle and buy
the Blazer. To complete the sale, he
executed a Buyer's Order, reflecting the
proposed
purchase,
and
a "Retail
Installment Sales Contract" (RISC I),
reflecting the proposed financing. The
Buyer's Order and RISC I both reflected
that Nigh would pay $4,000 down, and
trade in his prior vehicle. Nigh received no
price reduction for h is trade-in because he
estimated its remaining loan balance to
equal the price Koons B uick g ave him f or
it, but he also agreed to pay off any excess
balance over the estimate. Nigh, having
signed the contracts and turned them over to
Koons Buick, was committed to the
transaction and obliged to perform upon
counter-signature by Koons Buick. Koons
Buick did not counter-sign the documents
as Nigh signed them, but intended to sign
only once a lender agreed to buy an
assignment of the installment payments
owed under RISC I. The transaction's
closing and the completion of Nigh's
purchase were thus left within the
control.
unilateral
dealership's
Nigh left the dealership in the Blazer, on the
authority of a temporary certificate of
ownership issued under Va.Code § 46.21542. Nigh left his trade-in vehicle behind,
in anticipation that a lender would purchase

Koons Buick, again unable to find a willing
lender, called Nigh back. Nigh alleged the
dealership told him, via a message left with
his brother, that he had to come back to sign
a new RISC (RISC III) or it would report
the Blazer as stolen. Afraid of arrest, Nigh
returned to the dealership on March 5, and
under protest, signed RISC III with a backdate of February 25. Koons Buick later
closed the transaction by executing the
contract documents and selling assignment
of RISC III's installment payments to
Household
Automotive
Finance
Corporation (HAFC).
Afterwards, Nigh learned that his trade-in
vehicle had been repossessed from the
Koons Buick lot by its note-holder because
Nigh, believing the vehicle to have earlier
become property of Koons Buick, failed to
make required payments. Nigh also learned
that one of the reasons Koons Buick had
been unable to get a lender to accept RISC
II was that it contained an unaccounted for
charge, later determined to be for a product
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whose sale to Nigh had not been properly
documented, which Nigh did not recall
seeing on the transaction documents, and
which he never requested, agreed to accept,
or received. The product, a Silencer car
alarm, was listed on the second Buyer's
Order and on RISC II at a price of $965.
But absent from the transaction documents
was a Silencer "we owe" form, which is
used in retail car sales to document the sale
of "after market" products in financed
transactions. Disgruntled by the whole
affair, Nigh made no payments on the truck
and returned it to Koons Buick with a letter
asserting a right to rescission. HAFC
repossessed the truck from the dealership's
lot because Nigh made no payments.

[The court determined all parties had
followed appropriate procedure when filing
suit]
*

*

*

III.
[The appellate court did not review the legal
or factual determinations of the district
court, but rather, addresses the claims raised
on appeal, beginning first with Koons
Buick]
*

*

*

A.
Koons Buick attacks the district court's
denial of summary judgment on Nigh's
claim that RISC II constituted a TILA
violation on several grounds. First, Koons
Buick argues that because RISC II was
never counter-signed, it is an unfunded
financing agreement and cannot form the
basis for TILA liability. [Regulation Z (12
CFR
§226.17(b))
requires
creditors
operating under 15 USC §1638(b)(1) to
make TILA disclosures before the
transaction is consummated, e.g. before the
credit is extended. This said, TILA liability
cannot accrue until credit is extended.] [...]
The pertinent legal question then is what
consummation of a credit transaction, or
extension of credit, encompasses.

Nigh, claiming that Koons Buick defrauded
him, brought this action under the statutory
authority of TILA, FOA, and the VCPA,
and under the common law. Koons Buick
counterclaimed for breach of contract. The
district court granted summary judgment to
Koons Buick on its counterclaims and on
many of Nigh's claims, but preserved for
trial limited claims under TILA, FOA, and
the VCPA. At trial, Nigh prevailed on his
TILA claim that Koons Buick intentionally
included the charge for the Silencer on
RISC II without a basis for the charge, and
on his VCPA claim that Koons Buick
violated the VCPA by telling him that he
did not have valid possession of the Blazer
in order to induce him to sign RISC III. The
court issued a Supplemented and Final
Judgment on August 15, 2001, three months
after trial, to clarify its summary judgment
ruling on Koons Buick's counterclaims.
This order is the proceeding's final
judgment, from which appeal is now had.

Regulation Z defines consummation as the
"time
that
a
consumer becomes
contractually obligated
on a credit
transaction." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2 (emphasis
added). Under this regulation, a number of
courts have held that consummation, or
extension of credit, can encompass
unfunded financing agreements. We agree
with this rule because the regulation
expressly refers solely to the consumer's

II.

469

commitment and because TILA's express
purpose of protecting consumers from
receiving inadequate disclosures prior to
their entering into credit transactions could

not

otherwise

be

effectuated.

*

*

Lastly, but equally fatal to Koons Buick's
argument is the fact that the jury, after
being properly instructed on the law,
rejected Koons Buick's claim that the
Buyer's Order provided a basis for RISC
II's Silencer charge. [The jury's findings
were found to be sufficiently supported by
the evidence offered to the District Court,
and thus were upheld.]

[...]

conclude
that
we
Consequently,
consummation, or extension of credit, under
§ 1638 encompasses unfunded, financing
agreement options to which consumers
contractually commit, and under which they
can be bound at the lender's sole discretion.
Here, Nigh's signing of RISC II and his
giving over of the signed documents to
Koons Buick constituted consummation, or
an extension of credit. Thus, the district
court properly concluded that liability
attached " when N igh m ade t he choice a nd
committed himself to the purchase of
credit," Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC,
535,
549
143
F.Supp.2d
Inc.,
(E.D.Va.2001).

Koons Buick's last challenge to the TILA
judgment involves the court's application of
the statutory damages cap that 15 U.S.C. §
for TILA
establishes
1640(a)(2)(A)
liability. Koons Buick contends that the
court erred in allowing statutory damages of
twice the finance charge in connection with
the transaction, citing Mars v. Spartanburg
Chrysler Plymouth, 713 F.2d 65 (4th
§
interpreting
(summarily
Cir. 1983)
1640(a)(2)(A) to cap TILA statutory
damages in all individual actions at $1,000).
Koons Buick's reliance on Mars is
misplaced. In 1983, when Mars was
decided, the act read as follows:

Koons Buick next attacks its TILA liability
by arguing that, since the second Buyer's
Order Nigh signed has a line-item listing
the Silencer product for a price of $965,
RISC II's disclosures were accurate, and
thus do not violate TILA. But, for several
reasons this claim also fails. First, the
dealership conceded from the outset of this
action that t he $ 965 charge w as a mistake
and thus, by necessary implication, that

RISC II was inaccurate.

*

(a) ... any [TILA violator] is liable to

such person in an amount equal to the sum
of-....
(2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual
action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction,
or (ii) in the case of an individual action
relating to a consumer lease under part E of
this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total
amount of monthly payments under the
lease, except that the liability under this
subparagraph shall not be less than $100
nor
greater
than
$1,000[.]
§ 1640(a)(2)(A) (1980) (emphasis added).

[...] Having

conceded by affidavit, admission, and legal
argument that the Silencer line-item was in
error, Koons Buick cannot now contend that
it was not in error and thus that RISC II was
accurate.
Second, Koons Buick waived the legal
argument that the congruence between the
Buyer's Order and RISC II proves that
RISC II accurately disclosed the transaction
by virtue of the fact that it makes the
argument for the first time here in the Court
of Appeals.

In 1995, however, Congress amended the
act to read as follows:
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(a) ... any [TILA violator] is liable

awarded under subparagraph (i) are now
simply "twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction,"
and the court's instruction that if Koons
Buick violated TILA Nigh was "entitled to
twice the [entire] finance charge" was
proper.

to such person in an amount equal to the
sum of-....

(2)(A)(i) in the case of an
individual action twice the amount of any
finance charge in connection with the
transaction, (ii) in the case of an individual
action relating to a consumer lease under
part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of
the total amount of monthly payments
under the lease, except that the liability
under this subparagraph shall not be less
than $100 nor greater than $1,000, or (iii) in
the case of an individual action relating to a
credit transaction not under an open end
credit plan that is secured by real property
or a dwelling, not less than $200 or greater
than $2,000 [.] § 1640(a)(2)(A) (1995)
(emphasis added).

[The questions before the court are simply
whether Congress amended the statute in a
way relevant to the [Mars] interpretation,
and if it did, what does the amended statute
mean.] Our responsibility is thus not to
determine whether there is evidence that
"Congress intended to override the Fourth
Circuit's" precedent (or any circuit
precedent for that matter), as Judge Gregory
believes. See post at 131.

The Mars decision plausibly interpreted the
phrase "under this subparagraph" to apply
to the whole of subparagraph (A) in 1983.
But the 1995 amendment, by striking the
"or" preceding (ii), and inserting (iii) after
the "under this subparagraph" phrase,
rendered Mars' interpretation defunct.
Whereas in 1983 it was plausible to
interpret the maximum and minimum
provision as coming at the end of
subparagraph (A), and not exclusively
within subparagraph (ii), the new provision
clearly places that clause wholly within (ii).
Of even greater importance, the provision
now expressly sets a statutory maximum
and minimum in subparagraph (iii) that is
different from that provided in the preexisting maximum and minimum clause.
The inclusion of the new maximum and
minimum in (iii) shows that the clause
previously interpreted to apply to all of (A),
can no longer apply to (A), b ut must now
apply solely to (ii), so as not to render
meaningless the maximum and minimum
articulated in (iii). As a consequence of the
1995 amendment, the damages that may be

It could well be [...] that Congress did not
intend to alter the statutory cap applicable
under subparagraph (A)(i) when it amended
the statute in 1995. However, the critical
point of law-and it is critical- is that we do
not know what Congress intended; all that
we have before us is the amended statute
from which to determine intent. And, based
upon that statute, the far better, and indeed
compelled, interpretation is that Congress
did alter the statutory cap regardless of its
intent. It is the statute, not any inferential
intent, that constitutes the law. Of course, it
goes without saying, if Congress enacted
into law something different from what it
intended, then it can simply amend the
statute to bring the statute in line with
congressional intent. In this way, and in this
way only, are the constitutional roles of the
legislature and the courts respected.
Koons Buick's last substantive attack on the
district court's rulings involves the grant of
summary judgment on its counterclaims.
The dealership argues that the court erred
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by reversing, post-trial, its pre-trial grant of
summary judgment with respect to
installment payments owed by Nigh under
RISC III. But the court did not err in this
regard, because it did not reverse itself. As
the court made clear, the Supplemented and
Final Judgment, filed after trial, did not
change the court's pre-trial holding; it
simply "clarifie [d]" it (J.A. at 894).
*

*

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment in part.
I concur in sections II and III.B of the
majority opinion. I concur in section III.A
of the majority opinion with the exception
of that part of the majority opinion
analyzing the issue of whether
RISC II was inaccurate, see ante at 124
126. I agree that "Koons Buick waived the
legal argument that the congruence between
the Buyer's Order and RISC II proves that
the
disclosed
II
accurately
RISC
transaction," ante at 124, and thus, I concur
in the judgment as to this part and would
not reach the analysis of this issue.

*

Koons Buick also appeals the VCPA
judgment. That judgment, however, was
supported by properly admitted evidence
and was sufficient to establish that Koons
Buick made material misrepresentations to
Nigh. These misrepresentations were
intended to deceive, did deceive, and
caused loss; and the jury's verdict may not
be set aside. Koons Buick lastly challenges
the district c ourt's rulings on both p arties'
motions for costs and attorney fees. Its
objections are w ithout merit; the court d id
not abuse its discretion in reaching cost and
fee determinations.

GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.

B.

I.

[The court discusses Nigh's contention that
the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to Koons Buick on his TILA
claim involving RISC III and his claim to
be entitled to rescission. Nigh argued that
because RISC III was backdated, and
interest accrued as of the back-date, the
TILA disclosures should have been given
on the back-date as well. The language of
the TILA soundly refutes this argument.
The court also notes that title of the Blazer
was properly transferred to Nigh per
Virginia Code, and thus rescission is not
warranted.]

I write separately to dissent solely from the
Court's reading
of 15
U.S.C.
§
1640(a)(2)(A)(1998). I would find that
Congress, with the 1995 amendments to
TILA, did not change the application of the
$1,000 cap in § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii). Because
the cap still applies to (2)(A)(i), I would
find that the district court erred in granting
Nigh damages in excess of that statutory
limit.
II.
On appeal, Koons argues that the district
court improperly instructed the jury on the
measure of damages for Nigh's claim under
TILA. The district court informed the jury
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that, pursuant to TILA, damages were to be
equal to "twice t he amount ofa ny finance
charge in connection with the transaction."
§ 1640(a)(2)(A)(i); J.A. at 764. Based on
this instruction, the jury awarded Nigh
$24,192.80 on his TILA claim. Koons
insists that the $1,000 statutory cap in §
1640(a)(2)(A)(ii) applies to the calculation
of damages under (2)(A)(i), and that the
district judge should have reduced the
award accordingly.

and (2)(A)(ii). See Mars v. Spartanburg
Chrysler Plymouth, 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th
Cir.1983). See also Strange v. Monogram
Credit CardBank of Ga., 129 F.3d 943, 947
(7th Cir.1997) (citing Mars ).
This reading of the statute was buttressed
by the use of the same "under this
subparagraph" language in § 1640(a)(2)(B),
which stated (and still states), "[T]he total
recovery under this subparagraph ... shall

not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or I
per centum of the net worth of the creditor."
(Emphasis added). The plain reading of the
pre-1995 statute was that there was one
under
on
damages
statutory
cap
subparagraph (B) and a separate cap under
subparagraph (A). The use of the phrase
"under this subparagraph" in relation to
both limits made it clear that the caps were
applicable to the whole of their respective
subparagraphs. This was the reading of the
statute adopted by the Mars Court, and it is
an interpretation by which this panel is still
bound.

Before the 1995 amendments to TILA, 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a) read, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this
section, any creditor who fails to comply
with any requirement imposed under this
part ... with respect to any person is liable to

such person in an amount equal to the sum
of-... (2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual
action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction,
or (ii) in the case of an individual action
relating to a consumer lease under part E of
this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total
monthly payments under the lease, except
that the liability under this subparagraph
shall not be less than $100 nor greater than
$1000; or

In 1995, however, Congress amended the
statute to add (2)(A)(iii), relating to real
estate transactions. The current statute
reads, in relevant part: (2)(A)(i) in the case
of an individual action twice the amount of
any finance charge in connection with the
transaction, (ii) in the case of an individual
action relating to a consumer lease under
part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of
the total monthly payments under the lease,
except that the liability under this
subparagraphshall not be less than $100
nor greater than $1000, or (iii) in the case of
an individual action relating to a credit
transaction not under an open end credit
plan that is secured by real property or a
dwelling, not less than $200 or greater than
$2000....
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1998)
(emphasis added).

(B) in the case of a class action, such
amount as the court may allow, except that
under this
total recovery
... the
subparagraph... shall not be more than the

lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the
net worth of the creditor.... 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a)(1994) (emphasis added). That is,
subparagraph (A) concluded with the
qualification that "liability under this
subparagraph shall not be less than $100
nor greater than $1,000." Both parties
concede-and it is Fourth Circuit law-that
this limitation applied to the entire
subparagraph, both subsections (2)(A)(i)
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The 1995 amendments did not include any
wholesale changes to the statute; the newly
drafted third clause was simply tacked on to
the end of the subparagraph. Still, with the
addition of (2)(A)(iii), the phrase "under
this subparagraph" cannot apply to all of
(2)(A) as Congress initially intended,
because it does not apply to (iii), which has
its own cap of $2,000. Thus, the question
before this Court is whether Congress
meant to change the application of the
statutory cap, and thus abrogate Mars v.
Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth by adding
(2)(A)(iii) to the statute.

inclusion of the phrase "under this
subparagraph" would be superfluous; the
meaning of (ii) would be unchanged by its
deletion. It is, of course, a well-recognized
rule of statutory construction that courts
should "avoid a reading [of a statute] which
renders some words altogether redundant."
Lane v. United States, 286 F.3d 723, 731
(4th Cir.2002) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131
L.Ed.2d 1 (1995)). Therefore, a reading of &
1640 making the phrase "under this
subparagraph" meaningless should be
disfavored.

I would find that Mars is still good law
because there is no evidence that Congress
intended to override the Fourth Circuit's
long-standing application of the $1,000 cap
to both (2)(A)(i) and (2)(A)(ii). The
Seventh Circuit, the only Circuit outside of
our own to interpret the amended statute,
has explained:

Even more, to limit the $1,000 cap only to
(2)(A)(ii) would create an inconsistency
within the statute. The $2,000 cap in
(2)(A)(iii) applies only to that individual
clause, even though there is no phrase
limiting its effect to one "subparagraph." If
Congress also intended to limit the reach of
the statutory cap in (ii), then it would have
either deleted the words, "under this
subparagraph" from (ii), or included the
phrase in both (ii) and (iii). By declaring
that the statutory cap in (ii) should apply to
claims "under this subparagraph," but not
similarly qualifying the cap in (iii),
Congress must have meant the statutory
caps in those two clauses to have different
applications.

One could argue that § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) and
(ii) are separate "subparagraphs," and that
"liability under this subparagraph" means
only liability under § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii).
Although that reading h as a c ertain appeal
... the history of this part of the statute
suggests that such a reading has its own
problems. Until 1995, § 1640(a)(2)(A) had
only two subsections, the present (i)and
(ii). Courts uniformly interpreted the final
clause, which established the $100
minimum and the $1,000 maximum, as
applying to both (A)(i) and (A)(ii). Strange,
129 F.3d at 947 (emphasis added).

This reading is made even more compelling
when one considers that the phrase "under
this subparagraph" in § 1640(a)(2)(B)
indisputably applies to all of s ubparagraph
(B). Similarly, the statutory cap following
(2)(A)(ii) applies to all claims under
subparagraph (A), with the exception of
claims under (2)(A)(iii), which contains its
own, discrete limit. In short, the most
logical interpretation of the statute is to read
the phrase "under this subparagraph" as
applying
generally
to
an
entire
subparagraph, either (A) or (B), and to read

Disregarding the Seventh Circuit's wellreasoned analysis, the majority elects to
create a circuit split, reasoning that the
addition of (2)(A)(iii) has changed the
meaning of the word "subparagraph" in
(2)(A)(ii). If the $1,000 cap was intended to
apply only to (ii), however, then the
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(2)(A)(iii) as creating a specific carve-out
from that general rule for real-estate
transactions.
This is the reading that has been adopted by
the Seventh Circuit: [T]he 1995 amendment
was designed simply to establish a more
generous minimum and maximum for
certain secured transactions, without
changing the general rule on minimum and
maximum damage awards for the other two
parts of § 1640(a)(2)(A). We therefore
conclude
that
the
"subparagraph"
mentioned in § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii) continues
to encompass what is now codified as
subparts (A)(i) and (A)(ii), and not just
subpart (A)(ii). Strange, 129 F.3d 943, 947
(7th Cir.1997).
III.
In sum, I concur with the majority's
assessment that Koons engaged in a variety
of scurrilous business practices that support
the jury's finding of liability under both
TILA and the VCPA. However, for the
reasons articulated above, I believe that
Koons' statutory liability for its TILA
violation is capped at $1,000. Accordingly, I
dissent in part from the majority's judgment.
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In re: Michael B. Price; Christine R. Price, Debtors/Appellants v. Delaware State Police
Federal Credit Union, US Trustee
(03-2084)
370 F.3d 362
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Decided June 3, 2004

§521(2)(A) debtors could only (1) surrender
the cars, (2) purchase them in a lump-sum
payment, (3) negotiate another loan, or (4)
claim a recognized exemption.

In this case, Appellant debtors challenged a
judgment of the US District Court for the
District of Delaware upholding a bankruptcy
court's decision that 11 U.S.C.S. §
521(2)(A) did not permit them to continue
possessing their cars simply by paying their
bills. In their chapter 7 bankruptcy action,
the debtors listed two outstanding loans
secured by liens on their cars. Under §521,
debtors must inform the bankruptcy court
whether they intend to retain or surrender
collateral. Debtors filed a statement of
intention indicating that they intended to
continue regular payments to the creditor on
the two secured loans and retain their cars.
Interpreting the phrases governing property
retention, the bankruptcy court and district
court held that under 11 U.S.C.S.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed, holding that §521(2)(A), though
capable of 2 readings, was, when read as a
whole, a notice provision that did not restrict
the debtors from retaining their cars while
staying current on loan payments. The court
held that since in §521(C) Congress directed
courts to afford debtors the rights provided
elsewhere
in the Bankruptcy Code,
§521(2)(A) should be read as allowing
debtors to retain collateral and keep current
on their loans so long as that collateral was
adequately protected.
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High Court to Consider on Caps On Penalties Set by Lending Act
The Wall Street Journal
Wednesday, January 21, 2004
By Robert S. Greenberger

WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court, in a
case closely followed by the consumerfinance industry, agreed to consider whether
Congress meant to lift the cap on how much
money plaintiffs may collect in penalties for
certain lawsuits brought under the federal
Truth in Lending Act. The case mainly
involves two big-ticket lending areas, auto
and home-equity loans, where many
technical disputes often arise. "If the
Supreme Court were to affirm [the lower
court ruling], it would create great
incentives for lots and lots of' lawsuits, said
Roy Englert, a lawyer with Robbins,
Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner, a
Washington law firm that filed a brief in the
case on behalf of the American Bankers
Association and other groups.

this paragraph shall not be less than $100
nor greater than $1,000."
But Congress amended the law in 1995,
inserting language in the paragraph dealing
with the damage cap that might be
interpreted to mean that consumers could
collect either penalties of as much as $1,000,
or twice the amount of the finance charge,
which often is considerably more than
$1,000.
This ambiguity is at the heart of a lawsuit
filed by a consumer against a Virginia auto
dealer in 2000. Last year, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
Richmond, Va., affirmed a lower-court
decision awarding $24,192.80 - twice the
amount of the finance charges involved in
the disputed car sale - to the consumer.

Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act in
1968 primarily to require lenders to disclose
details of transactions. It allowed consumers
to collect recovery of damages for
violations, plus a penalty of between $100
and $1,000. Specifically, the law said the
penalty could be "twice the amount of the
finance charge in connection with the
transaction, except that the liability under

In its filing to the high court, the dealer,
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC Inc., said,
"There was never any suggestion that
Congress contemplated" removing the cap
from these loans. But the plaintiffs lawyers
countered: "Congress's silence on this point,
however, is of no help to Koons Buick."
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Seeking Truth in Car Loans
Newsday
Sunday, February 1, 2004
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Washington-At first, Bradley Nigh thought
he was getting a pretty good deal on the
1997 Chevrolet B lazer that h e b ought used
and financed through the car dealer.

Koons, backed by banking industry groups,
argued that the consumer protection law
caps damages at $1,000. Two lower courts
agreed with Nigh that 1995 amendments to
the law allow a wronged consumer to collect
much more - twice what the consumer
would have paid in finance charges.

After all, the dealer took his old truck as a
trade-in and promised to arrange a loan the
22-year-old could swing. Like many car
buyers, Nigh put money down, signed a
sales contract and drove home the same day
in his newly bought car.

The high court said Tuesday it will hear
Koons' appeal. Arguments probably will be
in October.
Every year, about 45 million cars are bought
and sold in the United States. Most deals
involve a financing plan through a bank or
other lender. Car loans and other kinds of
consumer credit are subject to the Truth in
Lending Act, which was intended to force
details of loans into the open and allow
consumers to evaluate the cost of credit
better.

The Fairfax, Va., man began to get cold feet
when Koons Buick Pontiac GMC later told
him he must put down an additional $2,000
to g et a loan. Nigh tried toback o ut when
the dealer called him back a third time and,
Nigh says, threatened to have him arrested
for auto theft if he did not sign yet a
different contract.
What happened next is now the subject of a
U.S. Supreme Court case that Nigh and his
lawyer say could cast light on misleading or
high-pressure sales tactics for car loans. The
court will examine whether a 1968
consumer protection law allows people like
Nigh to collect sizable damage awards if
they win their case.

The American Bankers Association told
justices in a friend-of-the-court filing that
violations of the Truth in Lending Act often
are inconsequential.
Allowing awards in the tens of thousands of
dollars will invite more lawsuits, bankers,
auto dealers and others argued in asking the
high court to hear the case.

In the Koons case, Nigh sued, alleging
violations of the Truth in Lending Act,
among other claims. The dealer countersued,
alleging that Nigh broke a contract.
Ultimately, a jury awarded Nigh about
$24,000 under the Truth in Lending Act,
plus money to pay his lawyer and an
additional $4,000 award under a Virginia
consumer law.

What happened to Nigh is a typical "yo-yo
deal,"
said his lawyer,
A. Hugo
Blankingship III. A buyer signs a deal
thinking he has financing at a certain rate,
but the dealer later says the buyer didn't
qualify for that rate or that other changes are
required before the deal can go through,
Blankingship said.
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Tricks Add Plenty To Car Costs
South FloridaSun-Sentinel
Monday, August 9, 2004
Robert K. Heady
It happens every day. A working-class guy
walks into an auto dealership and spots a car
he likes. The dealer works up the papers and
gets the guy to sign for a loan of, say, 9
percent on the spot, and ships them to a loan
outfit. Four days later the papers come back
with the loan rate boosted to 12 percent,
with the extra 3 percent being a "kickback"
to the dealer. Bottom line: The change will
cost the buyer an extra $1,200.

Ingalsbe adds that he's come across deals
where the lender has added $3,000 to the
initial price of a vehicle, raising it from
$8,000 to $11,000. Unlike with a mortgage
loan, where the customer has the legal right
to examine the contract in advance under the
Truth in Lending Act, the auto dealer may
not disclose all the dollar details beforehand.
"The act is not enforced in the car business,"
Ingalsbe says.

That and a host of other tricks are taking
place in today's predatory lending practices
in the automotive economy. Topping them
all is subprime lending - higher-thanaverage loan rates to folks with blemishes
on their credit records, and especially to
minorities including African-Americans and
Hispanics. Today there are more than 20
major class-action lawsuits in the United
States involving phony markups to people
like the guy I just described.

One of his clients, Lisa, signed a contract for
a new sports car. The vehicle had a
temporary license plate, but the dealer
promised to send her a new one. "That's all
right," she said. "I'm planning a trip to New
York and will phone you with my address,"
which she did. Three weeks later the dealer
returned her call to say the tag had arrived,
and they were shipping it via Federal
Express to New York. They gave her the
location to meet the FedEx truck. But when
Lisa arrived, there was no Fed Ex - instead,
only a repossession agent who grabbed her
car.

The problem is "systemic," says Raymond
G. Ingalsbe, a Florida attorney who
represents consumers against predatory auto
dealers and lenders. "All dealers below the
Cadillac label - probably 75 percent of all
dealerships - are competing against each
other in anti-competitive ways, They want to
take the customers out of the market
fraudulently by telling them to sign up
immediately, so they won't shop around.
Then, they call back and change the deal.

Michael Hudson, a predatory-loan expert
who
edited
Southern
Exposure's
investigative report, Banking on Misery,
describes situations where a behind-thescenes dealer team, following a system
advocated by their loan counterparts, created
fake pay stubs and false down payments to
secure higher-price financing. As a result,
there have been dealer markups as high as
$6,000 and loan rates as high as 20.75
percent. Plus, the Average Joe also gets hit
with costs like credit insurance, roadside

"Many times the dealer will shop the loan
application to four or five different I enders
to see who will give the biggest kickback."
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assistance plans, extended warranties and
service contracts.
According to the Federal Reserve, the
subprime auto loan market has quadrupled
in the past decade to $65 billion, while some
industry leaders put the figure as high as
$125 billion. AmeriCredit alone, the No. I
auto lender, has 1 million customers and a
$15 billion loan portfolio.
How can you fight back? Bernard Brown, a
consumer advocacy attorney based in
Kansas City, Mo., suggests the following:
"Before you leave the dealer's premises,
agree on the price of the car and insist on
seeing all the papers dealing with the
transaction. Normally the dealer sends you
the final papers later on. When they arrive,
go over them carefully, and if you see
something you don't agree with - something
that's changed tell the dealer immediately.
That's not what you agreed to."
Robert K. Heady is the founding publisher
of Bank Rate Monitor.
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Veneman, Ann (Sec. of Agric.) v. Livestock Marketing Association, et al./ Nebraska
Cattlemen, Inc. et al. v. Livestock Marketing Association, et al.
(03-1164/03-1165)
Ruling Below: (Livestock Marketing Association, et al. v. United States Department of
Agriculture, 335 F.3d 711; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630 (8th Cir 2003))
The court ruled that the compulsion to pay assessments for generic beef advertising was a form
of government interference with private speech. Under the compelled speech line of cases, the
government's interest in protecting the beef industry was not sufficiently substantial to justify
the i nfringement ont he c attle p roducer's F irst A mendment r ights. B ecause t he A ct w as n onseverable, no other aspects of it survived after this ruling.
Question Presented: Whether the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) and the
implementing Beef Promotion and Research Order (Beef Order) violate the First Amendment by
requiring beef producers and importers to pay transaction-based assessments to fund generic
advertising messages with which they disagree? Whether advertising is the predominant purpose
of the Beef Act or merely an ancillary purpose?

LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees
V.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; Ann Veneman, Secretary of
Agriculture; et al., Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Decided: July 8, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge:
[Appellants] appeal from an order of the
United States District Court for the District
of S outh Dakota in favor of the Livestock
Marketing Association ("LMA"), et al.
enjoining as unconstitutional the collection
of mandatory assessments from beef
producers under the Beef Promotion and
Research Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. § 2901 et
seq. ("the Beef Act"), to pay for generic
advertising of beef and beef products.
Livestock Marketing Ass'n v. United States
Dep 't of Agric., 207 F.Supp.2d 992
(D.S.D.2002) (LMA II ) (holding that the

Beef Act violates the free speech clause of
the First Amendment
and granting
permanent prospective injunctive relief).
For reversal, appellants argue that the
district court erred in its analysis (1)
because the advertising conducted pursuant
to the Beef Act is "government speech" and
therefore immune from First Amendment
scrutiny or (2) because the Beef Act
survives First Amendment scrutiny either as
regulation of commercial speech or as part
of a broader regulatory scheme. Appellants
additionally argue that the district court
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expenditures since 1998. [On February 23,
the District Court issued a
2001,
preliminary injunction enjoining any further
use of beef checkoff assessments for
furthering governmental policy.] Livestock
Marketing Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 132 F.Supp.2d 817 (D.S.D.2001)
(LMA I).

abused its discretion in fashioning an overly
broad injunction. For the reasons stated
below, we now affirm the order of the
district court.
Jurisdiction
[The Court discusses the procedural
arguments and concludes jurisdiction and
procedure were proper]

On June 25, 2001, the Supreme Court held
that mandatory assessments imposed on
mushroom producers for the purpose of
funding generic mushroom advertising
under the Mushroom Promotion, Research,
and C onsumer Information Act o f 1990, 7
U.S.C. § 6101 et seq. ("the Mushroom
Act"), violated the First Amendment.
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533
U.S. 405, 413, 121 S.Ct. 2334, 150 L.Ed.2d
438 (2001) (United Foods ) ("[T]he
mandated support is contrary to the First
Amendment principles set forth in cases
involving expression by groups which
include persons who object to the speech,
but who, nevertheless, must remain
members of the group by law or
necessity.") (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52
L.Ed.2d 261 (1977) (Abood ); Keller v.
State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2228, 110
L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (Keller )). The Supreme
Court distinguished the circumstances in
United Foods from those in Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S.
457, 117 S.Ct. 2130, 138 L.Ed.2d 585
(1997) (Glickman ) (rejecting First
Amendment
challenge to mandatory
agricultural assessments which paid for
generic advertising of California tree fruits),
decided four years earlier. The Court
explained that, in Glickman, "[t]he
producers of tree fruit who were compelled
to contribute funds for use in cooperative
advertising 'd[id] so as a part of a broader
collective enterprise in which their freedom
to act independently
[wa]s already

Background
[The Court discussed the background of the
Beef Promotion and Research Order ("the
Beef Order") as established by 7 U.S.C. §§
2903, 2904. The Beef Order requires beef
producers and importers to pay mandatory
transaction-based assessments ("the beef
checkoff program") which are designated
for beef-product promotion, advertising,
research, and consumer and industry
information. On November 12, 1999, LMA
submitted petitions to the USDA requesting
a referendum on whether to terminate or
suspend the Beef Order. See §§2906(b). No
action was taken on the petitions.]
On December 29, 2000, appellees filed
[LMA I] in the district court seeking: (1)
declaratory judgment that the Beef Act, or
the Secretary's actions or inactions pursuant
thereto, violate federal law; (2) an
injunction prohibiting the Secretary from
continuing the beef checkoff program; (3) a
preliminary injunction ordering defendants
to take immediate action toward a
referendum on the continuation of the beef
checkoff program; and (4) an order
requiring the Beef Board to cease
"producer
for
expenditures
communications" (i.e., messages designed
to discourage cattle producers from
supporting a referendum) and to make
restitution to producers of over $10 million,
representing producer
communications
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constrained by the regulatory scheme,' "
whereas, in United Foods, "the compelled
*715 contributions for advertising [were]
not part of some broader regulatory
scheme" and the advertising was itself the
"principal object" of the regulatory scheme.
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412, 415, 121
S.Ct. 2334.

program government speech, it would be
immune to First Amendment scrutiny. The
court then determined it was not
government speech, and not immune. The
District
Court
also
dismissed the
"regulation
of
commercial
speech"
argument by noting that such an argument
had been refused in Glickman.]

Thereafter, in the present case, the district
court granted appellees leave to amend their
complaint to include a First Amendment
claim in light of the Supreme Court's
United Foods decision. On August 3, 2001,
appellees filed an amended complaint
adding a claim that generic advertising
conducted pursuant to the Beef Act violates
their rights under the First Amendment to
freedom of speech and freedom of
association. The parties thereafter filed
partial
summary
for
cross-motions
judgment on the First Amendment claim,
and
those
motions
were
denied.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on
January 14, 2002, solely to address
appellees' First Amendment claim. Upon
considering the evidence presented, the
district court issued LMA II, setting forth
its findings of facts and conclusions of law.

Discussion
I.
[The court discusses its authority to review
the First Amendment question de novo]
In the present case, we have independently
reviewed the record and agree with the
district court's findings of crucial facts. For
example, we agree with the district court's
finding that appellees are compelled to pay
the statutorily-mandated assessments in
question. See LMA II, 207 F.Supp.2d at
997-98. Unlike fees charged for the use of
recreational facilities or special taxes
imposed
on
non-essential
consumer
products, the mandatory assessments at
issue in the present case are directly linked
to appellees' source of livelihood, and they
have no meaningful opportunity to avoid
these assessments. We also agree with the
district court that appellees, or at least some
of them, disagree with the generic
advertising conducted pursuant to the Beef
Act. See id. at 996-97. Finally, upon careful
consideration of the record and the pertinent
statutory provisions, we agree with the
district court that "[t]he beef checkoff is, in
all material respects, identical to the
mushroom checkoff' at issue in United
Foods, that "at least 50% of the assessments
collected and paid to the Beef Board are
used for advertising," and that "the
principal object of the beef checkoff
program is the commercial speech itself."
Id. at 1002.

[A bench trial was held on January 14, 2002
solely to address the First Amendment
claim, whereby the District Court issued
LMA II. The district court found that the
cattle producers were compelled to
associate and pay dues to an entity created
by federal statute, and thus the beef
checkoff program was in all material
respects identical to the mushroom checkoff
in United Foods, and therefore in violation
of the First Amendment rights of the cattle
producers.
"government
appellant's
As regards
speech" argument, the District Court began
with the assumption that were the checkoff

483

other things, that the Beef Board and the
Beef Committee were created pursuant to
the Beef Act, members of the Beef Board
and the Beef Committee serve at the
direction and under the control of the
Secretary, the Beef Act itself prescribes the
content of the Beef Board's and the Beef
Committee's speech as generic promotion
of beef and beef products, and the Beef Act
defines the powers and duties of the Beef
Board and the Beef Committee vis-a-vis
those promotional activities. Moreover,
they argue, the First Amendment exemption
for government speech applies whether it is
the government itself speaking or a private
entity enlisted by the government to speak
on the government's behalf. See, e.g., Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,
541, 121 S.Ct. 1043, 149 L.Ed.2d 63
(2001).

II.
Appellants first argue that appellees' First
Amendment claim is barred because the
advertising conducted pursuant to the Beef
Act is government speech and therefore
immune from First Amendment scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has never specifically
addressed this government
speech
argument in a case involving an agricultural
checkoff program. [...]

[The court reviewed various district court
attempts to address the government speech
argument, which were split on the issue
before presenting Appellate's position.]
*

*

*

[...]Appellants describe the government
speech
doctrine
as
follows:
The government is constitutionally entitled
to engage in its own speech without
implicating the First Amendment. As this
Court has recognized, " '[t]he First
Amendment does not prohibit
the
government itself from speaking, nor
require the government to speak. Similarly,
the First Amendment does not preclude the
government from exercising editorial
discretion over its own medium of
expression.' " [Brief for Appellants at 26].

Appellants also dispute the district court's
reasoning based upon the Third Circuit's
1989 decision in Frame. In Frame, the
Third Circuit emphasized that funding for
advertising under the Beef Act comes from
an identifiable group rather than a general
tax fund and reasoned that this type of
funding creates a "coerced nexus" between
the message and the group. However,
appellants argue, such reasoning based
upon a "coerced nexus" has been rejected
by the Supreme Court in cases such as
Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
217, 229, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193
(2000) (Southworth)

As to the determination of whether generic
advertising under the Beef Act is or is not
government speech, appellants cite our
decision in Ku Klux Klan for proposition
that government speech may be identified
based upon the central purpose of the
program, the degree of editorial control
exercised by the government over the
content of the message, and whether the
ultimate
the
bears
government
of the
for
the
content
responsibility
message. [Appellants] emphasize, among

III.
We begin our analysis by examining the socalled "government speech doctrine" at a
fundamental level. The government speech
doctrine has firm roots in our system of
jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court has
explained:
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Government officials are expected as a
part of the democratic process to
represent and to espouse the views of
a majority of their constituents. With
countless advocates outside of the
government seeking to influence its
policy, it would be ironic if those
charged with making governmental
decisions were not free to speak for
themselves in the process. If every
citizen were to have a right to insist
that no one paid by public funds
express a view with which he [or she]
disagreed, debate over issues of great
concern to the public would be limited
to those in the private sector, and the
process of government as we know it
radically transformed. Keller, 496 U.S.
at 12-13, 110 S.Ct. 2228 (citing
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
260, 102 S .Ct. 1051, 7 1 L.Ed.2d 127
(1982) (religious belief in conflict
with payment of taxes affords no basis
under the free exercise clause for
avoiding uniform tax obligation)).

university did iot wish to publicly
acknowledge the source of the offered
donation, as was required by law. That case
stands for the proposition [...] that, when

the government speaks in its role as the
government, it may be immune from First
Amendment challenge based upon its
choice of content.
[However, u]nlike in Ku Klux Klan, where
the plaintiffs challenged a decision
concerning the content of government
speech, appellees in the present case are
challenging the government's authority to
compel them to support speech with which
they personally disagree; such compulsion
is a form of "government interference with
private speech." The two categories of First
speech
cases-government
Amendment
cases and compelled speech cases-are
fundamentally different. [Appellants also
made reference to Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400,
115 S.Ct. 961, where the Supreme Court
ruled that when the government creates a
of
furtherance
for the
corporation
governmental objectives, and retains control
of t he internal s tructure, t he c orporation i s
Amendment
for
First
governmental
purposes. This reliance on Lebron was
ultimately ruled misplaced because in
Lebron, Amtrak was arguing it was not
governmental, and thus immune from First
Amendment
challenges.
Appellants
argument is the reverse-arguing the Beef
Board is governmental, and thus immune
from First Amendment challenge.]

However, the government speech doctrine
clearly does not provide immunity for all
types of First Amendment claims. Cf Santa
Fe Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302-10,
120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000)
(student-led prayers delivered prior to home
football games at a public high school
constituted public speech attributable to the
school district and thus violated the
First
of
the
clause
establishment
Amendment), cited in Charter, 230
F.Supp.2d at 1134-36. Nor do the cases
cited by appellants hold that, when the
government speaks, it is entirely immune
from all types of First Amendment free
speech claims. Our decision in Ku Klux
Klan, for example, upheld a discretionary
decision by a state university-run radio
station to decline an offer of an
the
because
donation
underwriting

In the present case, appellees have not
invoked the First Amendment to influence
the content ofthe generic beef advertising
at issue. Rather, they assert their First
Amendment
free
speech
and
free
association rights to protect themselves
from being compelled to pay for that
speech, with which they disagree. Their
First Amendment claim predominantly
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pronouncements in United Foods. In United
Foods, the Supreme Court went out of its
way to distinguish the broad cooperative
scheme that comprehensively regulated the
California tree fruit industry at issue in
comparatively
the
from
Glickman
unregulated, and more commercially
competitive, mushroom industry. The Court
also emphasized that c ollective a dvertising
was the "principal object" of the Mushroom
Act, United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415, 121

raises a free speech issue, and our analysis
is generally governed by the Supreme
Court's compelled speech line of cases,
including

Keller and Abood.

[...]

As

suggested by Justice Stevens in his
concurring opinion in United Foods, 533
U.S. at 417-18, 121 S.Ct. 2334, cases such
as Keller, Abood, and the case at barinvolving compelled payment of moneymay be viewed as the "compelled subsidy"
subset of the compelled speech cases.

S.Ct.

*

whereas

the

collective

advertising in Glickman was just one
among many of the "anticompetitive
features of the [California tree fruit]
marketing orders," Glickman, 521 U.S. at
470, 117 S.Ct. 2130. Accordingly, we
conclude that Glickman does not provide a
complete answer to this commercial speech
issue. We infer that, had the government
relied upon Central Hudson in United
Foods, the Supreme Court would have
adapted the Central Hudson test to the
circumstances of that case, but would
nevertheless have held that the Mushroom
regulated
unconstitutionally
Act

In compelled speech cases, the Supreme
Court has traditionally applied a balancingof-interests test to determine whether or not
the challenged governmental action is
justified. [...] In the present case, we must
decide what constitutional standard applies
when compelled subsidies are used to fund
generic commercial advertising. On this
question, appellants have consistently
argued that, even if the Beef Act is not
immune from First Amendment scrutiny
under the government speech doctrine, it
nevertheless survives First Amendment
scrutiny as regulation of commercial speech
under the Central Hudson standard.
*

2334,

commercial speech. [...] We reach this

conclusion recognizing that CentralHudson
involved a restriction on speech while the
present case involves compelled speech. In
our view, it is more significant that Central
Hudson and the case at bar both involve
government interference with private
speech
in
a
commercial
context.
Accordingly, because the beef checkoff
program at issue in the present case is
identical in all material respects to the
mushroom checkoff program at issue in
United Foods, we now adapt the Central
Hudson test to appellees' First Amendment
claim.

*

In the present case, as stated above, the
district court declined to apply the Central
Hudson test to appellees' First Amendment
claim, noting that the Supreme Court had
declined to apply that test in Glickman. See
LMA II, 207 F.Supp.2d at 999 ("The
Supreme Court in Glickman rejected the use
of the Central Hudson test because [Central
Hudson ] involved a restriction on
commercial speech rather than the
compelled funding of speech involved in
the California tree fruit marketing orders.")
(citing Glickman, 521 U.S. at 474 n. 18, 117
S.Ct. 2130). However, we disagree with the
district court's reasoning because it fails to
more
recent
for
the
account

In Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100
S.Ct. 2343, the Supreme Court explained:
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At the outset, we must determine
whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial
speech to come within that provision,
it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.

conclusion that the debated advertising is
not government speech, the court concluded
the government did not have a substantial
interest in the advertising. Even assuming a
substantial interest, however, the next
question to be answered is if the interest
was significantly substantial enough to
justify the infringement upon Appellee's
First Amendment rights. As laid down in
Central Hudson, this turns largely on the
nature of the speech in question.]
[The court discussed the various standards
applied when determining the nature of
speech-germaneness
and
viewpoint
neutrality. Ultimately, despite the standard
used, this analysis becomes an exercise in
line drawing.] The Supreme Court has
repeatedly warned that, when assessing the
nature of the speech in the compelled
based
upon
context-whether
speech
germaneness, viewpoint neutrality, or some
other benchmark-the analysis often comes
down to a difficult line-drawing exercise.

In adapting the Central Hudson test to the
particular circumstances of this case, we ask
not whether the expression at issue is
protected but rather whether appellees have
a protected interest in avoiding being
compelled to pay for the expression at issue
(the generic beef advertising). We have
already answered that question; under the
compelled speech line of cases, appellees
have a protected First A mendment i nterest
at stake. The remaining questions are
whether the governmental interest in the
beef checkoff program is substantial and, if
so, whether the beef checkoff program
directly advances that governmental interest
and is not more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest. Stated more succinctly,
the issue is whether the governmental
interest in the commercial advertising under
the Beef Act is sufficiently substantial to
justify the infringement upon appellees'
First Amendment right not to be compelled
to subsidize that commercial speech.

[...] The Supreme Court has already drawn

the relevant line for us. In United Foods,
the Supreme Court explained:
The statutory mechanism as it relates
to handlers of mushroom is
concededly different from the
scheme in Glickman; here the statute
does not require group action, save
to generate the very speech to which
some handlers object. In contrast to
the program upheld in Glickinan,
where the Government argued the
compelled
contributions
for
advertising were "part of a far
broader regulatory system that does
not principally concern speech,"
there is no broader regulatory system
in place here. We have not upheld
compelled subsidies for speech in
the c ontext o f a p rogram w here t he
principal object is speech itself.

Appellants' government speech arguments
are relevant to our assessment of the
substantiality of the government's interest.
[The court discussed the correlation
between the government's control over the
speech in question and its interest in said
speech. Drawing on the district court's
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Although greater regulation of the
mushroom market might have been
implemented,

...

the

*

*

*

This court is duty-bound to reconcile and
apply the precedents of the Supreme Court
to the best of our ability. The beef checkoff
program is, in all material respects,
identical to the mushroom checkoff

compelled

contributions for advertising are not
part of some broader regulatory
scheme. The only program the
Government contends the compelled
contributions serve is the very
advertising scheme in question.
Were it sufficient to say speech is
germane to itself, the limits observed
in Abood and Keller would be empty
of meaning and significance. The
cooperative
marketing structure
relied upon by a majority of the
Court in Glickman to sustain an
ancillary assessment finds no
corollary here; the expression
respondent is required to support is
not germane to a purpose related to
an association independent from the
speech itself; and the rationale of
Abood extends to the party who
objects to the compelled support for
this speech. 533 U.S. at 415-16, 121
S.Ct. 2334 (internal citation omitted)

program at issue in United Foods. [... W]e

conclude that the government's interest in
protecting the welfare ofthe beefindustry
by compelling all beef producers and
importers to pay for generic beef
advertising is not sufficiently substantial to
justify the infringement on appellees' First
Amendment free speech right.

[...]

IV.
[The court affirmed the district court
decision. It also held that the decision was
not limited to just the parties, and that the
Beef Act was not severable. Because the
compelled funding of advertising was the
principle object of the act, no other parts of
the Act survived this decision, and thus all
assessment collection had to cease upon the
rendering of the decision.]

[...]
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Where's the Beef? Heading For the Supreme Court
The New York Times
Tuesday May 25, 2004
Linda Greenhouse

"Beef: It's What's for Dinner" may simply
be a slogan to most consumers, but to a
group of disaffected beef producers, those
are fighting words that they should not have
to support through a government-imposed
assessment.

promoted consumption of pork through a
mandatory assessment on all hogs sold in
the United States. "Pork: The Other White
Meat" is the most visible aspect of that
campaign. The Supreme Court did not act
Monday on the Bush administration's appeal
of that decision, Veneman v. Campaign for
Family Farms, No.03-1180, but will decide
that case in light of its decision sometime
next year in the beef case.

The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
decide the constitutionality of a 1985 federal
law that requires beef producers to pay into
a fund that supports generic promotion
to encourage more beef
campaigns
consumption. The case is an appeal by the
Bush administration and a group of
Nebraska cattle producers from a ruling last
July by the federal appeals court in St. Louis
that declared that the program amounted to
compelled speech, unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.

The federal appeals court in Philadelphia
ruled three months ago that the dairy
promotion program that supports the "Got
Milk?" campaign through assessments on
dairy farmers was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court itself has been less than
clear. In 1997, it upheld federal assessments
on California producers of peaches and other
"tree fruit." But four years later, it
invalidated the assessment on mushroom
growers.

The $50 million program, paid for by an
assessment of $1 for each head of cattle, was
challenged by a smaller group of cattle
producers who maintained that the generic
campaign hurt their interests by making no
distinction for consumers between domestic
and imported beef.

As a matter of First Amendment doctrine,
the most interesting aspect of the new case is
a question that the earlier decisions did not
directly address: whether the speech at issue
is private speech, as the dissenting beef
producers maintain, or government speech,
as the administration asserts. Under the
administration's argument, there is nothing
remarkable, or unconstitutional, about
citizens being required to pay for a
particular government program, whether or
not they agree with its message.

The case, Veneman v. Livestock Marketing
Association, No.03-1164, is one of several
such disputes that reflect growing unrest and
various
among
interests
disparate
agricultural sectors.
Nearly simultaneously with the beef case, a
separate federal appeals court, in Cincinnati,
struck down a similar program that
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Judge Rules Against Fees for Beef Marketing Courts: Government is ordered to stop
collecting funds from farmers for research and promotion campaigns.
Los Angeles Times
Monday, June 24, 2002
From Bloomberg News

touting the fruit. California has its own
programs for promoting farm products.
Kornmann ruled Friday that the 1985 Beef
is
Act
and
Research
Promotion
unconstitutional, because "beef producers
cannot be compelled to finance advertising
programs with which they disagree,"
according to Billy Perrin, president of the
Livestock
Mo.-based
City,
Kansas
Marketing Assn. The association, joined by
nine ranchers and other groups, challenged
the law.

ABERDEEN, S.D. - A federal judge has
ruled that fees collected for the "Beef: It's
What's for Dinner" advertising campaign
violate the free-speech rights of cattle
producers, in the latest case in a longstanding dispute among farmers.
U.S. District Judge Charles B. Kornmann
ordered the government to stop collecting
the fee of $1 per head of cattle, which
amounts to about $88 million per year, to
fund the research and promotion campaign.
The order takes effect July 15.

The decision affects up to 1 million U.S.
farmers and ranchers who raise cattle. Last
year the sale of cattle and calves generated
$40.4 billion in income, or 20% of the $202
billion in U.S. agricultural sales. Most
opposition to the program is from small
ranchers; larger producers support it.

"I am disappointed by the ruling," U.S.
Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman said
in a statement. "We are consulting with the
Department of Justice to determine the next
steps." The department could seek an
injunction to permit fee collections beyond
July 15.

Perrin, a rancher and livestock dealer from
Hugo, Okla., said the advertising campaign
made "no distinction between U.S. and
foreign beef," and that restaurants or grocery
chains also benefited from the promotion at
the farmers' expense.

Farmers have complained for years that
forced funding of pitches for products
ranging from California raisins to milk to
cheese violates their rights to free speech.
A Supreme Court decision last year put
advertising campaigns for agricultural
products further in doubt, ruling that farmers
should not be forced to fund generic
marketing campaigns. Though the case
involving mushroom growers in Tennessee
resulted in a 6-3 ruling, the effect on
disputes elsewhere was unclear.

The Agriculture Department, which has
allowed farm cooperatives to market various
products since the Great Depression, regards
all such programs as useful tools to help
boost consumption of farm products.
"The beef promotion program in particular
has helped beef demand to increase and has
contributed to U.S. beef exports," Veneman
said.

In 1997, the court sided with growers of
California peaches and nectarines, who
disputed charges to pay for a series of ads
490

Sizzle, steak and lawsuits;
Supreme Court to hear California beef ad case with wide implications
The San FranciscoChronicle

Tuesday, May 25, 2004
Tom Abate

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to

California's Agricultural Issues Center at
UC Davis, said agricultural marketing orders
have been in force for decades. They have
long been based on the presumption that,
because consumers perceive crops as
commodities, the best way to promote their
consumption is by requiring all producers to
pay into a fund to market the commodity.

decide whether all cattle growers can be
forced to pay $1 a head to promote beef
sales, giving the justices a chance to
reconcile two earlier and somewhat
contradictory rulings that have sown
confusion in the multimillion dollar field of
agricultural advertising.

"The government said, in effect, we'll let
you tax the product and use the proceeds to
advertise it," Sumner said.

The justices have agreed to decide whether a
U.S. Department of Agriculture marketing
program, in effect since 1986, violates the
free speech rights of cattle farmers by
compelling them to pay for ads promoting
slogans such as "Beef: It's What's for
Dinner."

But large commercial farms trying to create
branded agricultural goods, and organic
producers who deem their products distinct
from
commercial
varieties,
have
increasingly challenged these governmentassessed generic advertising fees, Sumner
said.

But agricultural experts said the beef ruling
could affect a slew of similar cases being
argued in both federal and state courts in
which individual farmers have challenged
so-called food marketing orders that require
all producers to contribute money to tout the
virtues of a given crop.

The U.S. Supreme Court first took up the
issue of these compulsory ad fees when it
issued a 5-4 ruling in 1997 that upheld a
mandatory assessment on all handlers of
California peaches, nectarines and plums.

On the national level, dissident farmers have
sought to overturn compulsory payments
into the dairy industry's "Got Milk?" ad
campaign and the pork industry's "The
Other White Meat" promotion. In addition
to these federal challenges, 11 cases have
been filed in California state courts seeking
to overturn requirements that farmers pay to
advertise table grapes, eggs, raisins, plums,
apples and, most famously, cheese.

But in 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court
narrowed the California fruit precedent
when it voted 6-3 that an involuntary
assessment on mushroom growers, designed
to advertise the virtues of fungi, violated the
First Amendment by forcing growers to pay
for advertising against their will.
In an opinion written by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, the court explained why it

Daniel Sumner, who heads the University of
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overturned the mushroom assessment while
supporting the fruit levy. The sale of
California tree fruits was so controlled in
every aspect that growers had an antitrust
exemption, he wrote. Thus, ordering fruit
growers to pay into an advertising fund was
part of a broad regulatory scheme. "These
important features are not present here,"
Kennedy wrote in the mushroom case.
But the decision failed to draw a clear line
around w hen ad 1evies were p ermissible or
when they were not, said Richard Samp,
chief counsel for the Washington Legal
Foundation, a free-market think tank that
hopes to overturn agricultural marketing
orders.

These programs force growers to support
them."
Steve Lyle, spokesman for the California
Department of Food and Agriculture, said
his department hopes the state's top court
supports crop ads.
"We think these are good public policies,"
he said.
Because the state constitution has free
speech provisions separate from those in the
First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in the beef case may not be the
final word when it comes to potential
challenges to the 40-plus commodity
advertising programs sponsored under
California's food and agriculture auspices,
Leighton said. The beef and plum decisions
may have to be read together to settle the
issue in California.

"Maybe the reason the Supreme Court has
decided to hear this issue for a third time is
to make the law clear," Samp said.
Seth Waxman, a Washington attorney who
has argued in support of ad fees, said he
hoped the beef ruling "explains the means
by which collective programs for promotion
and generic advertising can satisfy the
Constitution."

Meanwhile, at the California Beef Council
in Pleasanton, executive director Virginia
Coehlo said her group gets about $1.1
million in advertising from the beef levy at
issue before the U.S. Supreme Court.

While the Supreme Court decision will
affect many national ad campaigns, a
separate legal campaign is being waged in
California, which has many state marketing
programs independent of the USDA.

Her state group keeps 50 cents of every
dollar collected for in-state advertising while
the rest goes to the national program, and
she thinks the spending is one reason why
beef consumption i s ont he rise a gain after
years of decline.

Attorney Brian Leighton of Clovis (Fresno
County) has challenged at least a dozen
advertising assessments on California crops
going back to 1986. By June 9, he expects
the California Supreme Court to rule on a
case involving the plum industry that could
set the rules for state marketing orders.

If the U.S. court overturns the federal
program, Coelho said her group would still
collect a dollar per head, and keep all of it
for in-state advertising, because California
has a marketing program distinct from the
USDA version.

"It's a classic free speech case," Leighton
said. "The Constitution allows you to choose
your message and choose your timing.

"But in today's climate, it's just a matter of
time before it's challenged," she said.
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U.S. Court Rejects Mandatory Levy On Dairy Farmers
The Wall Street Journal
Wednesday, February 25, 2004
By Scott Kilman
A
federal
appeals
court
declared
unconstitutional a mandatory fee on dairy
farmers that last year raised $255 million for
promotional activities such as the longrunning "got milk?" generic advertising
campaign. U.S. Department of Agriculture
Secretary Ann Veneman said late yesterday
that she is "disappointed" in the ruling,
is
the
Bush
administration
which
considering whether to challenge. The
Agriculture Department oversees the 20year-old program, under which dairy
farmers are required to pay into a fund that
promotes dairy consumption. Farmers pay
15 cents for every 100 pounds of milk they
sell.

In its ruling yesterday, a three-judge panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Philadelphia ruled that the dairy
program violates the First Amendment. The
amendment, which protects free speech,
prevents the government from compelling
people to express certain views.
Joseph and Brenda Cochran, the operators of
a 150-cow farm in Pennsylvania, filed the
suit with the complaint that they were being
forced to subsidize an advertising message
with which they object. A district court ruled
against the Cochrans in March 2003.
Populist farm groups have attacked the
programs in recent years on the grounds that
they primarily benefit large agricultural
corporations.

"USDA regards such programs, when
properly administered, as effective tools for
market enhancement," Ms. Veneman said in
a statement.

While the USDA polices the dairy check-off
program, the funds raised through it are
managed by a nonprofit organization called
Dairy Management Inc., which is based in
suburban Chicago. David Pelzer, a vice
president of the group, said its promotional
work will continue while the case is being
litigated.

The ruling is the latest in a string of court
decisions to go against so-called farmer
check-off programs that long have funded
some of the best-known generic ad
campaigns in the U.S., including those for
beef and pork. The dairy farmer program
raises the most money of any of the
mandatory programs.
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PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs
V.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al., Defendants

Ruling B elow: (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 32 Communications Reg.
(P&F) 962 (3 Cir, 2004))
The Appellate decision blocked the implementation of FCC media ownership rules proposed in
June 2003, holding that the FCC's justification of the rules was flawed. The rules, which would
have made it easier for media companies to expand by allowing increased cross-ownership of
television and radio stations and television/broadcast combinations in all markets, have been sent
back to the FCC for a redraft. The court questioned the FCC's decision to set specific limits on
media ownership. The court, however, did accept the FCC's new definition of a market, based on
Arbitron distinctions rather than geographical distance a station signal could travel. The entire
decision was reaffirmed on September 3, 2004, when the Third Circuit upheld the decision.
Question Presented: To what degree should media ownership be limited, given the dynamic
shift in technology since the last ownership rules were contemplated? Are the FCC rules
sufficiently responsive to the public interest?

PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs
V.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al., Defendants
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Decided June 24, 2004
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
In these consolidated appeals we consider
revisions by the Federal Communications
Commission to its regulations governing
broadcast media ownership that the
Commission promulgated following its 2002
biennial review. On July 2, 2003, the
Commission announced a comprehensive
overhaul of its broadcast media ownership
rules. It increased t he n umber oft elevision
stations a single entity may own, both
locally and nationally; revised various

provisions of the regulations governing
common ownership o f radio s tations i nt he
same community; and replaced two existing
rules limiting common ownership among
newspapers and broadcast stations (the
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule
and the radio/television cross-ownership
rule) with a single set of "Cross-Media
Limits." See Report and Orderand Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620
(2003) (the "Order").
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Several public interest and consumer
advocacy groups (collectively, the "Citizen
Petitioners") petitioned for judicial review
of the Order in various courts of appeals,
contending that its deregulatory provisions
contravened the Commission's
statutory
mandates as well as the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (the
"APA").
Associations
of
networks,
broadcasters, and newspaper owners also
challenged the Order, arguing that proregulatory revisions as well as the absence
of further
deregulation
violate the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (the "1996
Act"), the APA, and the United States
Constitution. The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, acting pursuant to
the random selection procedures of 28
U.S.C. § 2112(a), consolidated the petitions
in this Court. On September 3, 2003, we
stayed implementation of the rules pending
our review.

I. Background
[On June 2, 2003, the Commission adopted
the Order modifying its ownership rules to
provide a "new, comprehensive framework
for broadcast ownership regulation" by a
vote of 3-2. Order P 3. The Order was
released on July 2, 2003. The order modified
the existing local television rule to permit
television station triopolies in markets with
18 or more television stations and television
station duopolies in markets with 17 or
fewer
television
stations.
Moreover,
although retaining existing numerical limits
on radio ownership, the order changed the
method for determining radio markets.]

The Order announced the Commission's
decision to repeal both cross-ownership
rules
(television/newspaper,
radio/television) and replace them with a
single set of Cross-Media Limits. The
Commission determined that neither crossownership prohibition remained necessary in
the public interest to ensure competition,
diversity, or localism. Order PP 330, 371.
The new Cross-Media Limits prohibit
newspaper/broadcast
combinations
and
radio/television combinations in the smallest
DMAs, i.e., those with three or fewer fullpower
commercial
or
noncommercial television stations. Id. P 454. In
contrast, in the largest markets-those with
more than eight television stations-common
ownership among newspapers and broadcast
stations is unrestricted. Id. P 473. In
medium-sized markets-those with between
four and eight television stations-one entity
may own a newspaper and either (a) one
television station and up to 50% of the radio
stations that may be commonly owned in

For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
power of the Commission to regulate media
ownership. In doing so, we reject the
contention that the Constitution or § 202(h)
of the 1996 Act somehow provides rigid
limits on the Commission's ability to
regulate in the public interest. But we must
remand certain aspects of the Commission's
Order that a re n ot a dequately supported b y
the
Most
importantly,
record.
the
Commission has not sufficiently justified its
particular chosen numerical limits for I ocal
television ownership, local radio ownership,
and cross-ownership of media within local
markets. Accordingly, we partially remand
the Order for the Commission's additional
justification or modification, and we
partially affirm the Order. The stay will
continue pending our review of the
Commission's action on remand.
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reasoned analysis to support the limits that it
chose.

that market under the local radio rule or (b)
up to 100% of the radio stations allowed
under the local radio rule. Id. P 466.
In structuring its Cross-Media Limits, the
Commission drew upon a methodological
tool named the "Diversity Index," which the
Commission developed as a measure of
viewpoint diversity in local markets to
identify those "at-risk" markets where
consolidation would have a deleterious
effect.

The Commission concluded that crossownership limits were necessary in specific
situations to guard against "an elevated risk
of harm to the range and breadth of
viewpoints that may be available to the
public." Order P 4 42. But recognizing that
ownership limits impede the speech
opportunities for both broadcasters and
newspapers, the Commission endeavored to
craft new limits "as narrowly as possible."
Id. P 441. In that vein, the Commission
sought to identify "at risk" local marketsthose with high levels of viewpoint
concentration-where continued regulation
was necessary. By focusing its regulation on
those markets, the Commission hoped to
avoid needlessly overregulating markets
with already ample viewpoint diversity.

In a periodic review under § 202(h), the
Commission is required to determine
whether its then-extant rules remain useful
in the public interest; if no longer useful,
they must be repealed or modified. Yet no
matter what the Commission decides to do
to any particular rule-retain, repeal, or
modify (whether to make more or less
stringent)-it must do so in the public interest
and support its decision with a reasoned
analysis. We shall evaluate each aspect of
the Commission's Order accordingly.

But for all of its efforts, the Commission's
Cross-Media
Limits
employ
several
irrational assumptions and inconsistencies.
We do not object in principle to the
Commission's reliance on the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission's
antitrust
formula,
the
HerfindahlHirschmann Index ("HHI"), as its starting
point for measuring diversity in local
markets. In converting the HHI to a measure
for diversity in local markets, however, the
Commission gave too much weight to the
Internet as a media outlet, irrationally
assigned outlets of the same media type
equal market shares, and inconsistently
derived the Cross-Media Limits from its
Diversity Index results. For these reasons,
detailed below, we remand for the
Commission to justify or modify further its
Cross-Media Limits.

IV. Cross-OwnershipRules
The Commission's decision to repeal its
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rules
in favor of new Cross-Media Limits has
been attacked on all fronts. Some petitioners
support the repeal but argue that the CrossMedia Limits are too restrictive. Others
challenge the repeal decision and argue that
the new limits are too lenient. We conclude
that the Commission's decision to replace its
cross-ownership rules with the Cross-Media
Limits is not of itself constitutionally flawed
and does not violate § 202(h). But we cannot
uphold the Cross-Media Limits themselves
because the Commission does not provide a
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-underlies its decision to disregard actual
market share. The modified rule is similarly
unreasonable
in allowing
levels of
concentration to exceed further its own
benchmark for competition (1800)-a glaring
inconsistency between rationale and result.
We remand the numerical limits for the
Commission to support and harmonize its
rationale.

V. Local Television OwnershipRule
Both the Citizen Petitioners and the
Deregulatory Petitioners challenge the
Commission's modification to the local
television ownership rule, which would
allow triopolies in markets of 18 stations or
more and duopolies in other markets, subject
to a restriction on combinations of the four
largest stations in any market.

VI. Local Radio Ownership Rule
The Commission's assumption of equal
market shares received flak from both ends
of the objecting spectrum. The Citizen
Petitioners point out that television stations'
market shares vary widely and argue that it
is arbitrary for the Commission to base its
numerical limits on a rudimentary station
"head count" of outlets... .While the Citizen
Petitioners demonstrate the Commission's
flawed rationale with examples of what t he
modified rule allows, the Deregulatory
Petitioners demonstrate the same flaw by
pointing out what the modified rule forbids.
There is no logical reason, they argue, why
it should be impermissible to have five
duopolies and one triopoly (a total of six
competitors) in a market with 13 stations
when it is possible that the triopoly could
have a lower combined market share than
any or all of the duopolies.

Petitioners challenge the Commission's
decision to modify its local radio ownership
rule, which limits the number of commercial
radio stations that a party may own in local
markets of different sizes, 47 C.F.R. §
73.3555(a), by, among other changes,
adopting a new method for determining the
size of local markets. They also argue that
the Commission failed to justify its decision
to retain the rule's specific numerical limits.
We affirm the Commission's decision to
modify the rule (including modifying its
method for determining local market size),
but we agree that its decision to retain the
numerical
limits was arbitrary and
capricious, and hence remand for the
Commission's further consideration.

Both the Citizen Petitioners and the
Deregulatory Petitioners argue that the
Commission's decision to retain the existing
numerical
limits was arbitrary and
capricious.
Predictably,
the
Citizen
Petitioners argue that the Commission
should have tightened the existing limits,
and the Deregulatory Petitioners argue that
the C ommission should have relaxed t hem.
But both sides' predominant argument is
essentially the same: the numerical limits are
not supported by the Commission's theory

The deference with which we review the
decisions
line-drawing
Commission's
is
line-drawing
far
as
the
extends only so
consistent with the evidence or is not
"patently unreasonable." Sinclair, 284 F.3d
at 162. The Commission's numerical limits
are neither. No evidence supports the
share
market
equal
Commission's
assumption, and no reasonable explanation
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that they ensure five equal-sized competitors
in most markets. While, as discussed above,
substantial
evidence
supports
the
Commission's decision to retain the
numerical limits structure of its local radio
ownership rule, we also agree with the
Petitioners that the Order lacks a reasoned
analysis for retaining these specific
numerical limits. We thus remand for the
Commission's additional justification.

complex agency order, including its
rejection of the constitutional challenges, I
respectfully dissent from its decision to
vacate and remand. In my view, the Court's
decision has upended the usual way the
judiciary reviews agency rulemaking.
Whether the standard is "arbitrary or
capricious," "reasonableness," or some
variant of a "deregulatory presumption," the
Court has applied a threshold that supplants
the well-known principles of deference
accorded to agency decision-making. In so
doing, the Court has substituted its own
policy judgment for that of the Federal
Communications Commission and upset the
ongoing review of broadcast media
regulation mandated by Congress in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.

VII. Conclusion
Though
we affirm
much
of the
Commission's Order, we have identified
several provisions in which the Commission
falls short of its obligation to justify its
decisions to retain, repeal, or modify its
media ownership regulations w ith reasoned
analysis. The Commission's derivation of
new
Cross-Media
Limits,
and
its
modification of the numerical limits on both
television and radio station ownership in
local markets, all have the same essential
flaw: an unjustified assumption that media
outlets of the same type make an equal
contribution to diversity and competition in
local markets. We thus remand for the
Commission to justify or modify its
approach to setting numerical limits. We
also remand for the Commission to
reconsider or better explain its decision to
repeal the FSSR. The stay currently in effect
will continue pending our review of the
Commission's action on remand, over which
this panel retains jurisdiction.

I would lift the stay and allow the
Commission's media ownership rules to go
into effect. It is not the role of the judiciary
to second-guess the reasoned policy
judgments of an administrative agency
acting within the scope of its delegated
authority. Allowing the biennial (now
quadrennial) review process to run its course
will give the Commission and Congress the
opportunity to monitor and evaluate the
effect of the proposed rules on the media
marketplace. More importantly, it will
ensure that accountability for these crucial
policy decisions rests with the political
branches of our government.

A. Cross-hvnership Rule and the Diversity
Index

DISSENT:
The majority criticizes the weight given to
the Internet in the Diversity Index, as well as
the Commission's decision to attribute equal
market shares to different outlets within the
same media type. The majority also finds the
Commission inconsistently derived the

SCIRICA, Chief Judge, dissenting in part,
concurring in part.
Although I concur in some parts of the
Court's comprehensive analysis of this

498

Cross Media Limits from the Diversity
Index. Finally, the majority requires specific
notice of the Diversity Index on remand.

The majority finds that no evidence supports
the Commission's equal share assumption. I
disagree. The FCC found that a station's
market share is too fluid to use as a basis for
regulation, so its decision to regulate instead
a firm's "capacity" to deliver programming
is justified. Id. P 193. Because product
innovation and program choice vary with
each season, a firm's market share is more
fluid than in other industries. Thus, the FCC
focused on a firm's capacity to deliver
programming. Id. Over the life of a firm's
investment in a station, and the duration of
its l icense, the m arket breakdown c an shift
substantially.

Before addressing these conclusions, it bears
reiterating, as the Supreme Court recognized
in FCC v. NCCB, that "diversity and its
effects are . . . elusive c oncepts, n ot easily
defined let alone measured without making
qualitative judgments on both policy and
First Amendment grounds:" 436 U.S. at
796-97 (internal quotations omitted). In
reviewing the Agency's methodological
choices and line-drawing in these areas, the
Commission's
determinations
deserve
deference. See Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 159.
Furthermore, I agree with the Commission's
explanation that the Diversity Index is not
the final rule, nor the sole consideration
relied upon, but rather a tool created to
provide the Cross Media Limits with
empirical footing. As such, the Agency's
choice and formulation of a metric should be
granted deference unless it can be shown to
be unreasonable. The majority falls short of
such a showing.

C. Local Radio OwnershipRule
The majority supports the Commission's use
of numerical limits in the local radio
ownership rule but finds the Commission
did not support its decision to retain the
existing numerical limits established by §
202(b)....But I find the Commission to have
justified its choices.

B. Local Television Ownership Rule
The Commission may favor a certain market
structure if it reasonably supports its
decision. The Commission is the appropriate
body to choose between various equally
competitive
market
structures
when
formulating its rules.... In determining
appropriate
ownership
tiers,
the
Commission's use of antitrust theory
tailored to the radio industry is reasonable.

The majority upholds the top-4 limit in the
Local Television Ownership Rule but
vacates and remands the chosen numerical
limits "for the Commission to harmonize
certain inconsistencies and better support its
assumptions and rationale."

499

Court Backs Cross-Ownership Ban
Chicago Tribune
September 4, 2004
James P. Miller
access to news content from around the
globe.

A federal appeals court Friday turned down
a Tribune Co. request to allow media
companies to own a newspaper and a
broadcast TV station in the nation's biggest
media markets. Friday's ruling by the 3rd
U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals in
Philadelphia represents another setback for
Tribune's effort to loosen legal restrictions
on media "cross-ownership," though it is
likely not the final word on the matter.

But the FCC's regulatory easing drew a
legal challenge from critics opposed to
media concentration. And in June, the 3rd
Circuit sent much of the FCC's plan back to
the commission to be rewritten.
The 3rd Circuit's June action was widely
viewed as a victory for FCC critics. But the
appeals court's complex ruling also
suggested that the justices agreed with the
FCC that cross-ownership limits weren't
needed in markets so large that they have
nine or more TV stations.

Since 1975, a federal rule designed to
promote diversity in news markets bans
media companies from owning a newspaper
and a TV station in one market, although
companies that already had dual holdings
were allowed to keep them.

All four of Tribune's cross-ownership
situations are in markets that are that large.
And in July, rather than try to file an appeal
of t he c ourt's entire r uling, T ribune filed a
narrower appeal, simply asking the court to
lift the cross-ownership ban in large market
areas.

The ban presents a problem for Chicagobased Tribune which, as a result of
acquisitions, now owns newspapers and TV
stations in the New York, Los Angeles,
south Florida and Hartford, Conn., markets.
The strictures also could limit Tribune's
ability to make future acquisitions in
markets where it has either newspaper or TV
holdings,

Late Friday, the appeals court denied that
request. A copy of the ruling wasn't
available; a Tribune spokesman declined
immediate comment.

Locally, the company's ownership of the
Chicago Tribune and WGN-Ch. 9 is not an
issue since it predates the ban.
Last year, the Federal Communications
Commission overturned the long-standing
cross-ownership ban, saying that new
technologies-such as the Internet and
nationwide cable TV have rendered the
prohibition obsolete by giving consumers
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In Media Decision, the Little Guys Lost; A ruling that blocks or delays the FCC's relaxed
ownership rules hurts bids by smaller firms to battle with giant rivals
Los Angeles Times
June 26, 2004
Sallie Hofmeister

Determined to stop Big Media in its tracks,
consumer advocates, members of Congress
and some federal regulators declared victory
after an appeals court in Philadelphia
reversed the Federal Communications
Commission's bid to ease media-ownership
rules. Yet in many ways, Thursday's
decision by the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of
Appeals is a boon to the big guys.

Although hailing the court's decision,
consumer advocates acknowledged that the
media-merger frenzy of the 1990s had
placed most of the industry's reach into the
hands of a few behemoths.
"The worst damage has already been done,"
said Andrew Schwartzman, executive
director of the Media Access Project, one of
the winning plaintiffs in the Philadelphia
case, who has contended that media
consolidation stifles the diversity of voices
in communities and undermines the health
of democracy. "But we cannot undo the
massive consolidation that has already
occurred."

The largest companies in the industry,
including Walt Disney Co., News Corp. and
Viacom Inc., were largely unscathed by the
court's ruling. Meanwhile, the real losers
were the relatively small newspaper and
broadcast concerns that were hoping to bulk
up to better compete against the giants.

Regulations adopted in the mid-1990s
allowed companies that produce TV
programs to buy broadcast networks that
distribute them. As a result, Disney now
owns ABC, Viacom owns CBS and News
Corp. owns Fox.

"It's a world upside-down," said Alan J.
Freedom
of
Bell,
chief executive
Communications Inc., the owner of eight TV
stations and 28 daily newspapers, including
the Orange County Register. "The financial
pinch is greatest in the small markets" where
the industry's mid-size players would like to
buy up multiple media outlets.

These big conglomerates, which in turn
control the nation's largest and most
profitable
television
stations,
then
aggressively took advantage of rules letting
them buy even more outlets - including
multiple TV stations in the biggest cities.

Now that the court has put the kibosh on
those deals, it will be harder for companies
like Freedom to boost their efficiency.
"It puts on hold plans that many owners of
TV stations and newspapers had to swap or
buy properties," said Bell, who refused to
elaborate on any specific transactions in the
works.

News Corp., for instance, boasts two
stations - a situation known as a "duopoly"
in nine of the top 16 U.S. markets. Smaller
rivals, such as Freedom, don't have the
financial muscle to pry their way into those
areas.
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To help level the playing field, the FCC last
summer allowed the ownership of more than
one station in smaller markets.

Nonetheless, the court said the FCC had to
provide a better justification for lifting the
ban, a ruling that clouds the prospects for
further deal-making, as well as for eventual
license renewals at KTLA and KPNX.

At the same time, the agency lifted a 1975
ban on the ownership of both a newspaper
and a television or radio station in the same
market. The idea was to give more
companies a chance to take on the News
Corp.'s of the world.

By contrast, Thursday's court decision
created barely a ripple at News Corp., which
some industry executives see as the prime
example of media consolidation.

Schwartzman noted that several companies,
including Tribune Co., Gannett Co. and
Media General Inc., had made acquisitions
in recent years anticipating the FCC's rule
changes.

In the New York area alone, News Corp.
controls several news outlets, including the
New York Post, two television stations and
the cable channel Fox News. In addition, it
owns satellite-television service DirecTV,
the latest addition to Chairman Rupert
Murdoch's media empire.

In 2000, for instance, Tribune bought Times
Mirror Co., the owner of the Los Angeles
Times, even though it owned a local
television station, KTLA Channel 5, that put
it in violation of the cross-ownership rules.
The same year, Gannett acquired the
Arizona Republic despite its ownership of
KPNX-TV, a station serving Phoenix.

"News Corp. is an example of why this
debate is so weird," said one television
executive.
"This
is
about
media
concentration, but who has more control
over news in New York than Rupert
Murdoch? The unintended consequences of
this decision is that the big guys will
continue to be b ig, and the smaller p layers
have been emasculated."

On Thursday, the court said the FCC was
within its rights to repeal the newspaperbroadcast cross-ownership ban - a positive
note for Tribune and Gannett.
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Powell Calls Rejection of Media Rules a Disappointment
The Washington Post
June 29, 2004
Frank Ahrens
When a federal appeals court returned
several media ownership rules to the Federal
Communications Commission last week, it
was a "deep disappointment" to Chairman
Michael K. Powell, who said the
commission may have erred in trying to pass
all of the controversial rules at once. On
Thursday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
3rd Circuit sent back three proposed FCC
media ownership rules that would determine
how many newspapers, television and radio
stations companies such as Tribune Co. and
Viacom Inc. can own. The proposed rules
would have relaxed some standards,
allowing one company to own a newspaper
and television station in the same city for the
first time in nearly 30 years, but would have
tightened others, such as limits on local
radio ownership.

ownership rules calls the whole process into
question, Powell said.
"The previous commission drew tighter
lines, and the court said they could not
justify those. This commission drew slightly
looser lines, and we still couldn't justify
those," said Powell, FCC chairman since
2001. "It may not be possible to line-draw.
Part of me says maybe the best answer is to
evaluate on a case-by-case basis. The
commission may end up getting more
pushed in that direction."
Last week's court ruling left national limits
on media ownership intact, but rules on local
media ownership
would
face legal
challenges if the FCC tried to enforce them.
In the interview yesterday, Powell appeared
to waver between taking up each acquisition
in a local market on its own merits or trying
again to set rules that would apply to all
mergers.

The court said the FCC's justification for the
new rules was flawed, though it agreed with
some of the commission's deregulatory
policies. The result: All of the new rules are
stayed until the FCC decides whether to
appeal the decision to the Supreme Court or
submit rewritten versions to the appeals
court.

In writing the recent rules, commissioners
faced the difficult problem of trying to graft
mathematics onto social policy. In the end,
the court didn't buy the FCC's approach,
writing, "Most importantly, the Commission
has not sufficiently justified its particular
chosen numerical limits for local television
ownership, local radio ownership, and crossownership of media within local markets."

In a wide-ranging interview yesterday - the
first he has given since the rules were sent
back

-

Powell

lamented

the

lack

of

deference shown by the court to the FCC,
the expert agency charged with devising the
rules. Some of the proposed rules were
substitutes for previous attempts to limit
ownership that had been sent back by other
courts. Having a court reject a second set of

It is the FCC's job to police the radio and
television broadcast airwaves, which in
theory belong to the public, and to make
certain
that rules
governing
media
ownership ensure "localism, diversity and
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different media outlets, such as television
stations and newspapers.

competition."
As a result, the FCC has tried to set limits on
how many newspapers and television and
radio stations companies may own,
balancing the desire of big companies to
grow bigger against the threat that a few
companies will dominate the airwaves and
choke out smaller voices.

The diversity index was modeled on the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market
concentration that the Justice Department
uses in antitrust cases. As a former Justice
antitrust lawyer, Powell was well-acquainted
with this device. Yet the court slammed the
door on Powell's approach, saying it failed
to take into account each media outlet's
audience size, a major flaw.

Largely, the agency has failed. As a result, it
has lost some of its authority to make media
rules.

"There is no question that what we were
doing was completely novel," Powell said.
"I do think we did it fairly well, but I think
we had some areas of weakness. I'm willing
to be self-critical. I think certain aspects
could have been better explained." Still,
Powell said he thinks the index is
"defensible."

For instance, the FCC said one company
may not own a group of stations reaching
more than 35 percent of the national
audience. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit said there may be no legal
justification for any cap and sent the rule
back to the FCC. In January, Congress took
away the F CC's power to set the limit and
set its own limit at 39 percent.

Not persuaded by arguments in favor of the
rules, the court wrote last week: "A diversity
index that requires us to accept that a
community college television station makes
a greater contribution to viewpoint diversity
than a conglomerate that includes the thirdlargest newspaper in America also requires
us to abandon both logic and reality."

When Powell and the FCC media bureau
began revising media ownership rules in
2002, as they were required by Congress to
do, they said this time would be different.
This time the FCC's approach was to
inundate Congress and the courts with data,
demonstrating with tables, charts, graphs
and formulas how it arrived at its numbers.

Last week's ruling brings some form of
closure to a tumultuous period of more than
a year. A politically split FCC adopted the
proposed rules on June 2, 2003, with Powell
and fellow Republican commissioners Kevin
J. Martin and Kathleen Q. Abernathy voting
for them. Democratic
commissioners
Michael J. Copps and Jonathan S. Adelstein
opposed them, saying they would allow big
media companies to grow too big.

On Thursday, the appeals court told Powell
and the FCC, essentially, that its math was
wrong.
Perhaps the toughest blow to Powell's
expertise was the court's rejection of the
FCC's "diversity index," a complicated
formula d evised t o w eight a11 o ft he m edia
outlets - television and radio stations,
newspapers, cable channels, the Internet,
etc. - to which consumers are exposed. The
FCC would use the diversity index when
deciding which mergers to allow among

During the process, the FCC was flooded
with millions of e-mails and postcards
protesting the new rules, bringing together
unlikely and bipartisan coalitions. Powell
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said yesterday it might have been a bad
political idea to try to push all the rules
through at once.

limits in place. But they chose not to bring
the case before the D.C. appeals court,
which they said they thought would not be
sympathetic to their cause.

"I believed, as good government and good
policy, bringing them together as a unified
whole was a good instinct and idea," he said.
"At the end of the day, it's worth some
consideration as to whether they should be
rolled up like that. It's hard to manage and
very complex and creates all kinds of legal
twists and turns...

Instead, the Prometheus Radio Project - a
Philadelphia community radio organization
that led the complaint - filed its appeal in
several jurisdictions across the country.
When this happens, a lottery picks the court
that will hear the case. Prometheus rolled the
dice, and Philadelphia was chosen.

. Maybe it works better

to take them individually, and that's one of
the things I would consider going forward."

"I still believe we would have had a very
different result if it had gone to the D.C.
Circuit," Powell said. "That's why those
who opposed it were so aggressive about
going to a different court."

The rules may also have appeared poorly
justified to the court because they were the
product of a shaky coalition, according to
several sources within the FCC who spoke
on the condition of anonymity because of
the political sensitivity of the issue. Powell
stood between Democrats Copps and
Adelstein, who thought the proposed rules
were too deregulatory, and Republican
Martin, who thought they were not
Powell
needed
enough.
deregulatory
Martin's vote to pass the rules, and certain
elements of the diversity index may have
been pushed too far to justify further
deregulation, sources said.

It's too early to say what the FCC will do
next, Powell said. Copps read the court's
decision as a repudiation of what he
considered the Republican majority's media
deregulation. He called for a series of
nationwide public hearings and more studies
before the agency takes another run at the
rules. "The rush to media consolidation
approved by the FCC last June was wrong as
a matter of law and policy," Copps said.
Powell said yesterday that he is still
digesting the rules but found some promise
in the court's decision and suggested
opponents claimed a larger victory than was
actually won.

Then there was the issue of court shopping.
The chairman has said he followed the
direction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, which told the FCC it
should pursue a more deregulatory course,
saying it had to justify keeping ownership
limits rather than justify jettisoning them.

"The court wants more explanation for the
lines we drew," he said. "Yes, we failed to
convince them on the first try. But we were
not sort of way out of whack the way
people portrayed it."

Opponents of the proposed rules sued to
stop the proposed rules and keep tighter

505

Rewriting the Rules; FCC Relaxes Limits on Media Ownership;
A party-line agency vote gives broadcasters more freedom to grow and to merge with
newspapers. Critics fear fewer sources for news, entertainment
Los Angeles Times
June 3, 2003
Edmund Sanders and Jube Shiver Jr.,
mergers. "I don't think it's going to be
nearly the level that some people are
expecting."

The federal government's top media
regulators on Monday loosened decades-old
restraints on the broadcast industry, boosting
the ability of companies to navigate rapidly
changing markets but raising fears about
their
control
of
information
and
entertainment.

In the near term, media consumers are likely
to experience few changes i nt he p rograms
they watch and hear or the newspapers they
read. In time, however, companies are likely
to create combinations that might find a
newspaper and a TV station sharing stories
and resources. Or conglomerates may buy
more local stations and fill their schedules
with shows that have aired on the
company's cable channels. Companies that
own multiple TV stations in a single city
also are likely to gain more leverage with
advertisers, perhaps by offering ad packages
on multiple outlets.

In a bitter split along party lines, the
Republican majority of the Federal
Communications Commission - led by
Chairman Michael K. Powell - voted 3 to 2
to relax rules that prevented TV stations
from merging with local newspapers and
restricted how many stations one company
could own, both nationally and locally.
The broad revision of ownership rules clears
the way for further consolidation by the
biggest media conglomerates, enhancing the
economic prospects of companies such as
News Corp., Viacom Inc. and Tribune Co.,
parent of the Los Angeles Times.

In Los Angeles, Tribune willbe permitted to
continue its ownership of both the Los
Angeles Times and KTLA Channel 5.
Without Monday's action, the company
would have been required to divest itself of
one of those properties by 2006, when the
station's broadcast license comes up for
renewal.

But the vote drew threats of congressional
countermeasures and protests from critics as
diverse as the conservative National Rifle
Assn. and the liberal National Organization
for Women. And the FCC's review of media
ownership rules leading up to Monday's
vote generated enough response last week to
crash the agency's telephone network.
"If you listen to the
there's going to be
opportunity," Powell
interview, about the

The new rules will take effect early this
summer.
Blair Levin, a former FCC chief of staff who
is now a financial analyst for investment
firm Legg Mason, predicted "an awful lot of
station
swaps
and
trades
fairly
immediately."

spin, you'd believe
a massive buying
said, in a Monday
fear of new mega-
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Some broadcasters had argued vigorously
that a relaxed regulatory environment was
needed to protect free television in an era of
500-channel cable and satellite TV outlets.
A spokesman for Viacom, which had
lobbied to lift all FCC media rules, called
the vote a "first step" and said it would
"help
ensure that free, over-the-air
broadcasting continues to be available
across America."

radio stations in their market count and
redraw local radio markets - changes aimed
at correcting anomalies that permitted radio
behemoth Clear Channel Communications
Inc. to own all the stations in one city.
The rules generally will not require any
broadcaster to shed any holdings, however.
In theory - though no such plan exists, and
this combination would be unlikely - the net
effect of the changes would permit a single
company to own the following media outlets
in Los Angeles: the Los Angeles Times,
KTLA, KCBS Channel 2, KCOP Channel
13, Time Warner Cable, KIIS-FM, KBIGFM, KLOS-FM, KOST-FM, KROQ-FM,
KNX-AM, KFWB-AM and KABC-AM.

Under the new rules, broadcasters are
permitted to own stations reaching 45% of
the nation's viewers, up from 35%, allowing
TV networks to raise the number of wholly
owned stations that carry their shows.
Without the reforms, Viacom, which owns
CBS, and News Corp., which owns Fox,
would have been required to sell properties,
because each owns stations covering nearly
40% of national viewers.

The FCC acted under a federal law that
requires it to review media ownership rules
every two years. The agency also was under
a mandate from the U.S. Court of Appeals to
justify the need for some of its media
ownership
rules.

But the FCC retained a rule that prevents
mergers among the four biggest TV
networks - ABC, CBS, Fox and NBC.
Some of the most significant changes apply
to TV ownership in local markets. In the
nation's nine largest cities, including Los
Angeles, o ne p erson o r company m ay now
own three TV stations, up from two.

Civil rights activists Jesse Jackson and Dick
Gregory were among protesters who
gathered outside the FCC's Washington
headquarters Monday and derided the
changes. The FCC was inundated with more
than half a million e-mails, faxes and phone
calls in the months before Monday's vote.

In all but the smallest markets, moreover,
the new rules repeal a 28-year-old ban on
cross-ownership of TV stations and
newspapers. Such combinations are still
forbidden in markets with fewer than four
TV stations.

After the vote, even some broadcasters
blasted the FCC.
"In adopting a national television ownership
cap of 45%, the Federal Communications
Commission has taken a giant step back
from our nation's commitment to localism the principle that local programming
decisions should be made in the best
interests of the local community," said Alan
Frank, president of Post-Newsweek Stations
and chairman of Network Affiliated Stations

Rules restricting local mergers of radio and
TV stations also were relaxed.
The FCC did not alter caps that bar
companies from owning more than eight
radio stations in markets where 45 or more
exist. But the agency will include public
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Alliance, a trade group that represents
several hundred TV network affiliated
stations.

And many political experts doubt whether
opponents can muster the Capitol Hill votes
needed to reverse the agency.

The FCC's two Democrats, Michael J.
Copps and Jonathan S. Adelstein, sided with
opponents, saying the rule changes would
reduce the diversity of viewpoints and have
a chilling effect on local news reporting.

The latest rules are almost certain to be
challenged in court. In the last two years, the
U.S. Court of Appeals has thrown out or
asked for modifications of five of the FCC's
media ownership rules, saying the agency
failed to adequately justify them.

"This is the most sweeping and destructive
rollback of consumer protection rules in the
history
of American
broadcasting,"
Adelstein said.

Richmond, Va.-based Media General has
said it may sue because the relaxation of the
newspaper-TV rule failed to provide relief to
the small markets where it owns properties.
Experts say small and local markets are
likely to be a major battleground.

Powell, son of Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell, said he was disappointed that he was
unable to win over either Democrat and was
puzzled by their refusal to support any of
Monday's decisions, including the retention
of the dual-network rule and tightening of
the local radio rule. "At some point, this
issue became very political," Powell said.

"In the end, this isn't about the national
voices because, let's face it, there are a lot of
them out there," said Robert J. Thompson,
founder of the Center for the Study of
Popular Television at Syracuse University.

Just hours after the FCC meeting ended
Monday, a bipartisan group of U.S. senators
said they had the votes to pass a measure,
introduced by Sens. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
and Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), to retain the
35% national TV viewer cap.

"It's in the local markets where this is really
going to be felt the most. There are a lot of
towns out there now that feel lucky if they
have one local radio talk show left."
For Powell, Monday's vote was something
of a political comeback after the
embarrassing defeat this year of his
telephone deregulation proposal - and a
triumph for his belief that new regulations
are necessary.

"A lot of Republicans ... probably most of

the Republicans in Congress, would not
agree with this decision," said Sen. Trent
Lott (R-Miss.).
A bill similar to Stevens'
introduced in the House.

has

been

"I'm proud of what we did," he said
Monday. "But I don't feel like it's a
vindication. I'm not gloating. I'm not a
politician. I'm a regulator."

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) has summoned
all five FCC commissioners to a Senate
Commerce
Committee
meeting
on
Wednesday to explain their actions. But
McCain and his counterpart in the House,
W.J. "Billy" Tauzin (R-La.), so far have not
joined efforts to roll back the rule changes.

A New View
Five key media ownership rules change with
the Federal Communications Commission's
Monday vote, and one remains the same.
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National TV Ownership Cap

No company may own TV stations reaching
more than 35% of the nation's viewers.

Radio: One company may own a TV station
plus one, four or seven radio stations,
depending upon the number of "voices" in
the market. Voices include TV, radio,
newspaper and cable outlets. Replaces two
cross-ownership rules.

New

New

No company may own TV stations reaching
more than 45% of the nation's viewers.

* Cross-ownership bans in markets with
nine or more TV stations are eliminated.

*

* In markets with four to eight TV stations,
a company can own one of following three
combinations:

Old

Rule: Local TV Ownership Limit
Old

- A newspaper, a TV station and up to half
of the maximum number of radio stations
allowed in a market.

One company can own two TV stations in
the same market if only one ranks in
market's top four and there are eight
remaining separately owned stations after
the merger.

- A newspaper and the maximum number of
radio stations allowed in a market.
Two TV stations and the maximum number
of radio stations allowed in a market.

New

* In markets with three or fewer TV
stations, no cross-ownership is allowed, but
a company may seek a waiver of the ban if it
can show that the TV station doesn't serve
the area covered by the radio station or the
newspaper.

One company can own two TV stations in
same market if only one ranks in the
market's top four and the market has at least
five stations. One company can own three
TV stations in the same market if only one
ranks in the market's top four and the
market has at least 18 stations.

*
*

Rule: Local Radio Ownership Limit
Rule: Local Broadcast-Newspaper and
Local TV-Radio Cross-OwnershipLimits

Old
One company may own eight stations in
markets with 45 total; seven stations in
markets with 30-44 total; six stations in
markets with 15-29; five stations in markets
with 14 or fewer. Radio markets are defined
by using Nielsen ratings.

Old
Newspaper: One company may not own a
daily newspaper and TV or radio station in
the same market.
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New
No change in the caps, but markets now will
be defined by an adjusted Arbitron system to
correct past anomalies.

Rule: Dual-Network Ban
Old
Mergers prohibited among top
networks ABC, CBS, Fox and NBC.

four

New
No change.
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Senate Votes to Block FCC Media Rules;
Republicans Join Opposition to Easing of Ownership Limits; House Test Ahead
The Washington Post
September 17, 2003
Frank Ahrens

The Senate voted 55 to 40 yesterday to wipe
out all of the Federal Communications
Commission's controversial new media
ownership rules, the broadest bipartisan
repudiation yet of regulations that would
free big media companies to get bigger.

"We think that the rules that the FCC came
up with more accurately reflect the changing
media landscape and the current state of
network station ownership, while guarding
against undue
concentration
in the
marketplace," said White House spokesman
Scott McClellan. "So we think the FCC did
its job. "

The Republican-controlled Senate passed a
"resolution of disapproval," a little-used
legislative tool that allows Congress to
overturn federal agency regulations. The
resolution was sponsored by Sen. Byron L.
Dorgan (D-N.D.), who said the FCC rules
would lead to "galloping concentration" in
the media industry, with fewer and fewer
more and more
owning
companies
newspapers, television and radio stations,
and cable channels.

McClellan and other Republicans noted that
the resolution did not receive enough votes two-thirds of the Senate, or 67 ayes - to
override a veto.
On June 2, the five FCC commissioners
voted 3 to 2 along party lines to pass new
media ownership rules that would allow one
corporation to own the top newspaper and
television station in the same city in most
U.S. markets, a situation known as "crossownership." The new rules would permit
broadcast networks such as Fox and NBC to
buy more television stations, enabling them
to reach 45 percent of the national audience,
up from the current national cap of 35
percent.

"The rules are massively unpopular, just
from an appearance standpoint," Dorgan
said. "They're a massive cave-in to
corporate interests at the expense of the
public interest."
Opposition to the new media rules has come
from members of both parties, though the
are Democrats.
of critics
majority
Nevertheless, Dorgan's resolution was cosponsored by Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and
passed with the help of 12 Republican votes.
Republicans in both houses have defied a
White House veto threat by backing
measures that would dismantle some or all
of the FCC's proposed rules.

The new regulations would also tighten rules
covering radio stations in response to public
and legislative concerns about growing
ownership
concentration.
Dorgan's
resolution would overturn that rule as well,
possibly opening the way for more radio
consolidation.
The architect of the new rules is FCC
Chairman Michael K. Powell, who was
appointed to the commission during the

Still, the White House refused to back down.
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was rejected by a 254 to 174 vote. "I will
vigorously resist any attempts to revisit
these issues this year."

Clinton administration but given the
chairmanship by President Bush. One of the
three
commission's
five-member
Republicans, Powell is the son of Secretary
of State Colin L. Powell.

To get on the House calendar, the resolution
must pass through the Rules Committee,
chaired by Rep. David Dreier (R-Calif.).
Tauzin spokesman Ken Johnson said the bill
is unlikely to be put on the calendar.

Powell has defended the commission's
actions, saying the new rules were needed in
part to respond to previous court rulings that
overturned portions of the existing rules.

"Technically, the bill has no official status in
the House," Johnson said. "It can be held at
the speaker's desk collecting dust and
cobwebs for the rest of recorded time."

Dorgan's resolution "would bring no clarity
to media regulation, only chaos," Powell
said in a statement. "It would create perverse
results, such as a return to looser radio rules
permitting greater consolidation. This is a
harm the FCC's new media rules were
designed to avoid. It would also reinstate
ownership rules that were overturned by the
courts."

The resolution, however, is only one way to
overturn the rules. On Sept. 3, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit in
Philadelphia put the new rules on hold as it
considered an appeal. Legislation also is
moving forward in both houses to retain at
least the 35 percent national cap on
television station ownership.

Powell noted that under the terms of the
resolution, the FCC would be barred from
reissuing any substantially similar rules. "In
short, the agency would be powerless to cure
the infirmities identified by the court," he
said.

The House has already approved the
measure in the form of a rider to a spending
bill that would bar the FCC from enforcing a
45 percent cap. The Senate is to consider a
spending bill with a similar rider. Dorgan
said he plans to introduce an additional rider
that would reinstate the b an on newspapertelevision station cross-ownership - a
provision that would accomplish the same
thing as his resolution.

The resolution now heads to the House,
where Dorgan admitted it will face "some
white-water rapids."
In a statement yesterday, Rep. W.J. "Billy"
Tauzin (R-La.), chairman of the Energy and
Commerce Committee and a defender of the
new FCC rules, said he will fight to keep
them intact.

"I happen to a gree w ith t he i dea o f h aving
several different strategies," Dorgan said.
The fate of a second rider is uncertain
because a similar attempt has already failed
in the House. And even if both houses
approve riders establishing a 35 percent cap,
the language would still have to survive
conference committee negotiations in which
some Republican leaders hope to strip the
measure from the appropriations bill.

"The House of Representatives has
thoroughly debated - and soundly defeated an earlier attempt to roll back key provisions
of t he FCC's new media ownership r ules,"
Tauzin said, referring to a measure
introduced in July by Rep. Maurice D.
that would have
Hinchey (D-N.Y.)
FCC rules, which
the
of
dismantled some
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Sen. John Breaux (D-La.), one of the few
Democrats
voting
against
Dorgan's
resolution, said the debate over a 35 or 45
percent national cap is irrelevant when toprated CBS reaches only 3.4 percent of the
national audience nightly.
"It's like saying an auto dealer in New York
has 6 percent of the total sales in the U.S.
because New York has 6 percent of the total
population," he said.
Expectations in the Republican-controlled
Congress have been that the FCC's rules
would survive largely intact because of the
support of key b ackers such as T auzin a nd
C.W. Bill Young (R-Fla.), chairman of the
House Appropriations Committee. But even
Republicans acknowledged that the national
ownership cap was vulnerable to attack, as it
had become a hot-button issue for those
concerned about more media consolidation.
Several Republican staffers predicted that
the cap will end up back at 35 percent or at a
compromise of 40 percent.
That could cause problems for Viacom Inc.,
which owns CBS, and News Corp., which
owns Fox. Both have station groups that
reach about 40 percent of the national
audience, meaning they exceed a 35 percent
cap. But each received a waiver from the
FCC to buy the extra stations under the
assumption that the 35 percent cap would be
raised.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES; STATE FARM INSURANCE V. CAMPBELL
Insurers Urge U.S. Supreme Court to Change Utah Ruling in
Landmark Punitive Damages Case
www.insurancejoumal.com
September 9, 2004
Supreme Court's decision was correctly
followed.

The National Association of Mutual
Insurance Companies (NAMIC) and the
Property Casualty Insurers Association of
America (PCI) have filed an amicus brief
urging the U.S. Supreme Court to consider a
remand of a second Utah Supreme Court
judgment on punitive damages in the case of
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Campbell and Inez Preece
Campbell.

"The Utah Supreme Court flouted this
Court's opinion and mandate, disregarding
reasoned
carefully
Court's
the
conclusion.. .and the proper proportion
compensatory
and
punitive
between
damages in this case," the associations' brief
said.
The brief also argues that, "the 'devastating
potential for harm' posed by arbitrary and
excessive punitive damages awards.. .is
revived and exacerbated by the Utah
Supreme Court's decision. It is thus critical
that this (U.S. Supreme) Court correct that
decision, not only to ensure compliance with
its mandate in this case, but to ensure the
continuing vitality of the constitutional
standards for review of punitive damages."

In 2002, the Utah Supreme Court awarded
punitive damages of $145 million, with
compensatory damages of S1 million in a
case that involved an auto crash. On appeal
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in that the
special d amage award was far in excess o f
what would be permitted by the
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. The case was remanded
to the Utah Supreme Court to reconsider its
decision to make it consistent with the
Federal Supreme Court's ruling.

Speaking on behalf of their members, the
associations
maintain
that
such an
outrageous award could impact future
punitive damage cases involving other
insurers.

In its decision following the remand, the
Utah Supreme Court awarded punitive
damages of $9 million to the plaintiffs,
raising the issue of whether the U.S.
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Justices Limit Punitive Damages in Victory for Tort Revision
The New York Times
April 8, 2003
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court set new constitutional
limits on punitive damages today in a ruling
that the business community hailed as a
major victory in the long-running effort to
shield
corporate
defendants
from
unconstrained jury awards.

Justice Kennedy said the ratio of 145 to 1
resulted in a damage award that was "neither
reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong
committed." He called it "an irrational and
arbitrary deprivation of the property of the
defendant."

Punitive damages are not new to the court,
which has wrestled with the issue for 20
years and has become increasingly
sympathetic to defendants. But this decision
in favor of the State Farm insurance
company went beyond recent rulings in
ways that could have a widespread effect.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg objected that the court had
arrogated to itself a task best left to state
courts and state legislatures. She called the
court "boldly out of order."
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas also dissented in separate opinions,
citing their views expressed in earlier cases
that the Constitution's due process guarantee
simply does not apply in the context of
punitive damages. All three dissenters today
had also dissented in the court's last major
punitive damages ruling, a 1996 decision
that overturned a $2 million punitive
damage award against the BMW automobile
company, won by an Alabama man who was
not informed that the paint had been touched
up on his new car.

The most significant departure in the 6-to-3
decision was the court's declaration that
juries should generally not be permitted to
consider a defendant's wealth when setting a
punitive damage award. The practice is
common, and the court had not previously
addressed it in a majority opinion. "The
wealth of a defendant cannot justify an
otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages
award," Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said
for the majority today.

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined
the dissenters in the 1996 case, BMW of
North America v. Gore. Today, he changed
sides, without explanation, signing Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion along with
Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day
O'Connor, David H. Souter and Stephen G.
Breyer.

The court overturned $145 million in
punitive damages that a Utah jury awarded
against State Farm and that the Utah
Supreme Court upheld. The jury had
awarded $1 million in compensatory
damages to a Utah couple, State Farm
policyholders, who sued the company for its
refusal to settle a claim and for exposing
them to personal liability beyond the limits
of their policy for a car accident in which a
jury found the husband liable. State Farm
eventually paid the claim.

State Farm's appeal presented a wide array
of issues, and the argument in the case last
December
appeared
confusing
and
inconclusive. But there was nothing
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The BMW decision had not set a particular
ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages that would be acceptable, but
suggested that 4:1 would be a reasonable
maximum in most cases. Today, the court
moved closer to setting a firm line. "When
compensatory damages are substantial, then
a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to
compensatory damages, can reach the
outermost limit of the due process
guarantee," Justice Kennedy said.

inconclusive about the court's decision,
State Farm v. Campbell, No. 01-1289. "This
case is neither close nor difficult," Justice
Kennedy said.
While State Farm's treatment of its
policyholders, Curtis and Inez Campbell,
"merits no praise," and could even be
considered "reprehensible," he said, the
punitive damage award fails to meet any of
the guidelines the court set in the 1996 case
for evaluating such awards.

This part of the opinion drew a sharp
response from Justice Ginsburg. Such line
drawing "could hardly be questioned" if
done by a legislature or a state supreme
court, she said, but was "boldly out of order"
when done by the United States Supreme
Court and imposed on the states. Her
opinion included a discussion of State
Farm's business practices that was more
unflattering than the description of the case
history contained in the majority opinion.

He said that rather than insisting that the
punitive damage award bear a reasonable
relationship to the harm done to the
Campbells - essentially, 18 months of
uncertainty on their financial future - the
Utah Supreme Court had permitted the case
to be "used as a platform to expose, and
punish, the perceived deficiencies of State
Farm's operations throughout the country."
That was impermissible for two reasons,
Justice Kennedy said. First, states do not
have "a legitimate concern" in imposing
damages for conduct outside their borders or
in reaching conclusions about what another
state's court system might deem worthy of
punishment. That was "a basic principle of
federalism," he said.

Finally, Justice Kennedy said, a punitive
damage award should be related to the size
of a civil penalty the state could impose for
the same conduct. In this case, he said, State
Farm could have been fined $10,000 under
Utah law for its treatment of its
policyholders.
The decision today was undoubtedly not the
court's last word on punitive damages.
Several times, Justice Kennedy noted the
court was dealing with a case in which only
economic, and not physical, harm had
occurred, suggesting the court might make a
more generous allowance for punitive
damages in product liability cases involving
injury or death.

And second, Justice Kennedy said, punitive
damages must relate to the harm done to the
individual plaintiff and not to other
plaintiffs, real or hypothetical. "A defendant
should be punished for the conduct that
harmed the plaintiff, not for being an
unsavory individual or business," he said,
adding that without that constraint,
defendants could be punished multiple times
for the same conduct.
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High Court Orders New Look at Punitive Award; Philip Morris
Had Faced $79.5 Million Judgment
The Washington Post
October 7, 2003
Edward Walsh
The Supreme Court overturned a $79.5
million judgment against tobacco company
Philip Morris yesterday, and ordered lower
courts in Oregon to reconsider the case in
light of a high court ruling in April that said
there are limits to punitive damages that can
be awarded in civil lawsuits.

The Supreme Court considered the
relationship between compensatory and
punitive damages in its April ruling. The
court then overturned a Utah Supreme
Court decision to reinstate an award of $145
million in punitive damages to a couple that
had sued State Farm Insurance Cos. over its
handling of an automobile accident case.

The order was a clear indication that the
Supreme Court intends to follow the
standard it set in the April ruling, which
suggested that punitive damages awards that
exceed the amount of compensatory
damages in the same case by much more
than a single-digit ratio may violate the due
process clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Writing for the 6-to-3 majority in the State
Farm case, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
said the court was not imposing a rigid,
"bright line" ratio on the permissible amount
of punitive damages. But he went on to
suggest a "single-digit" standard that would
generally limit punitive damages to about
nine times the amount of compensatory
damages.

It was also a v ictory for Philip Morris and
other companies facing civil lawsuits in
which juries often award very high punitive
damages to plaintiffs.

"In sum, courts must ensure that the measure
of punishment is both reasonable and
proportionate to the amount of harm to the
plaintiff and to the general damages
recovered," Kennedy wrote.

Yesterday's ruling involved a lawsuit
against Philip Morris by the family of Jesse
D. Williams, an Oregon janitor who died of
lung cancer in 1997 after smoking Marlboro
cigarettes for more than 40 years. In 1999, a
jury awarded the family $800,000 in
compensatory damages and $79.5 million in
punitive damages.

In the Oregon case, punitive damages of 10
times the $800,000 compensatory damages
award would be $8 million - one-fourth of
the reduced award of $32 million in punitive
damages approved by the trial judge.

The trial judge reduced punitive damages
to $32 million, but the Oregon Court of
Appeals reinstated the full $79.5 million.
Compensatory damages are meant to make
up for actual damages suffered by a plaintiff
in a civil lawsuit. Juries often also award
punitive damages to punish wrongdoing and
act as a deterrent.

In a statement after yesterday's Supreme
Court ruling, Philip Morris said it will ask
the Oregon Court of Appeals to order a new
trial on all issues in the case, not just the
punitive damages. The company said
punitive damages that were almost 100
times the compensatory damages in the case
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were "far in excess of what the Supreme
Court has suggested is constitutionally
permissible."
William S. Ohlemeyer, vice president and
associate general counsel of Altria Group
Inc., the parent of Philip Morris, said that in
the Oregon case and "every other West
Coast individual case in which a punitive
award has been returned against Philip
Morris USA, juries have been allowed to
consider evidence of harm to persons other
than the plaintiff, conduct outside the state
and the company's wealth - all in direct
conflict with the Supreme Court's findings
in State Farm."
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